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Abstract 
This thesis examines the Nixon administration’s response to the Munich Massacre; a 
terrorist attack which took place at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. By examining the 
contextual considerations influencing the administration’s response in both the domestic and 
international spheres, this thesis will determine the manner in which diplomatic intricacies 
impacted on the introduction of precedent setting counterterrorism institutions. 
Furthermore, it will expound the correlation between the Nixon administration’s response 
and a developing conceptualisation of acts of modern international terrorism. 
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Introduction and Historiography 
Subdue by terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic  
Maximilien Robespierre 17931 
Maximilien Robespierre articulated his conception of terrorism as a „virtuous‟ political 
weapon in 1793, during the „reign of terror‟ after the French Revolution. The sentiment has 
surprisingly endured to become a defining tenet of conflict in the modern world. In the 
wake of the Munich Massacre in 1972, renowned French philosopher, John Paul Sartre 
offered this same justification for the slaughter of 11 innocent Israeli athletes by the 
Fedayeen („men of sacrifice‟), of the Black September Organisation, a militant arm of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation.  Sartre declared that „terrorism is a terrible weapon but 
the oppressed poor have no others.‟2 When the Black September Organisation executed an 
incursion of the Olympic Village in Munich,3 seizing nine members of the Israeli Olympic 
team and killing two others, they were armed with their own validation as „subdu[ing] by 
terror the enemies of liberty‟ in deliberate echo of Robespierre.45 The operation ended in 
                                                          
1 Maximilien Robespierre, „Justification of the Use of Terror,‟ Fordham University, Internet Modern 
History Sourcebook: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/robespierre-terror.html [accessed 
10/6/2011] 
2J.P. Sartre, „”About Munich” La Cause du peuple‟, J'accuse, No. 29, du 15 (October, 1972),  
translated by Elizabeth Bowman in „Sartre on Munich 1972‟, Sartre Studies International, Vol. 9, 
(December, 2003). 
3 The code name for the Munich Massacre was „Operation Iqrit and Biri‟m‟. The reference was to two 
ancient Arab Christian Villages that the Israeli Army had evacuated in 1948 because of „security 
reasons‟. See S. Reeve, One Day in September, (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000), p.43-44. 
4 Robespierre, „Justification of the Use of Terror,‟ 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/robespierre-terror.html [accessed 10/6/2011] 
5 After the Munich Massacre, radio announcers on the „Voice of Palestine‟ read a letter supposedly the 
last words of the terrorists (many claim that it was written afterwards in order to gain sympathy) We 
are neither killers nor bandits, we are persecuted people who have no land and no homeland… We 
will the youth of the Arab nation to search for death so that life is given to them, their countries and 
their people. Each drop of blood spilled from you and from us will be oil to kindle this nation with 
flames of victory and liberation cited in Reeve, One Day in September, p.147. 
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tragedy when a flawed rescue attempt by West German authorities culminated in a gunfight 
that took the lives of all of the nine hostages and all but three of the terrorists.6   
The Munich Massacre profoundly affected the international community. A new form of 
terrorism had been born; it had no regard for borders or for the innocence of its targets. 
Despite the aforementioned rationalisations of terror, the Black September Organisation‟s 
operation did not trigger sympathetic appreciation of the plight of the Palestinian freedom 
fighters among the main powers, but instead generated a course of international 
condemnation led by the administration of United States President, Richard Nixon. The 
attack prompted an international legal debate on the issue of terrorism and the development 
of permanent institutional counterterrorism measures.7 The Nixon administration‟s response 
to the Munich Massacre was the beginning of a conceptual turn in the history of political 
violence that we now know as „international terrorism‟.8 
This thesis revisits the history of the Munich Massacre in order to bringing into closer focus 
that conceptual turn. It explores the variety of contextual elements that shaped the Nixon 
administration‟s response and galvanised an impetus for the United States to fight terrorism 
on the global battlefield. It then goes on to read the Munich Massacre back into the history of 
American foreign policy and explore the significance of the Nixon administration‟s response 
in the history of international terrorism and counterterrorism.  
The Munich Massacre‟s importance in the longer history of terrorism has received 
significant attention from scholars. As Walter Laqueur, a heavyweight in the study of the 
theoretical history of terrorism, declares, the Munich Massacre was the „most spectacular‟ of 
                                                          
6 S. Reeve, One Day in September, introduction. See also L. Sonneborn, Murder and the 1972 Olympics, 
(New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2003). 
7 W. Tapley Bennett, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism’, 
International Lawyer, 7, No.4 (1973), p.760. 
8 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006), pp. 66-67. 
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the „massive scale‟ terrorism that began to occur after the Six Day War in 1967.9 None of 
these studies, however, take into account the Nixon administration‟s reaction to the attack 
and the implications of that response.  As well as establishing the significance of the 
American response to the Munich Massacre to the broader history of terrorism; this thesis 
also revitalises the role of individuals, by investigating the complex and varied contexts in 
which individual political decisions are made. The analysis focuses primarily on the 
personal perceptions, decisions and actions of President Nixon and his National Security 
Adviser, Henry Kissinger. This approach is required because both Nixon and Kissinger 
deliberately centralised foreign policy in the White House, rather than leaving it to an 
autonomous State Department. As a result of Nixon‟s and Kissinger‟s „advanced 
megalomania,‟10 most diplomatic operations were managed by them directly. 
Circumvention of the Department of State and bureaucratic machinery became standard 
form.11 The core source for this analysis is the diplomatic cables between the primary 
decision makers and official White House memoranda. This empirically driven analysis 
provides a rich tableau from which to consider how diplomatic intricacies contributed to the 
Nixon administration‟s response and investigate the intersecting contexts that shaped, and 
influenced policy making.  
The historiography of the Munich Massacre divides into two main strands of analysis that 
remain largely divorced from each other. The most comprehensive of these strands is the 
theoretical history of modern terrorism which is primarily concerned with the conceptual or 
ideological underpinnings of incidents like the Munich Massacre. Analysts such as Stefan 
Aubrey in, The New Dimension of International Terrorism, David Rapoport in The Four Waves of 
                                                          
9 W. Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century, (Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2004), p.101. 
10 J. Hoff, „A Revisionist View of Nixon‟s Foreign Policy,‟ Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, 
(Winter, 1996), p.107, See also A. Summers, The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon, 
(New York: Phoenix Press, 2000), p.330. 
11 R. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), p.110-111. 
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Modern Terrorism, Denis Piszkiewicz in Terrorism’s war with America and Walter Laqueur in 
his various texts such as A History of Terrorism, New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of 
Mass Destruction and No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century12 have provided 
thematic histories of modern terrorism by isolating political, ideological or religious 
motivations driving particular terrorist trends. The Munich Massacre has featured in these 
histories primarily as representative of what Denis Piszkiewicz has described as „terrorism‟s 
war on America.‟13  
Piszkiewicz has made reference to a phenomenon throughout the 1960s and 1970s identified 
by David Rapoport in The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism as the „revolutionary wave‟ or 
„third wave‟ of terrorism. Rapoport claims that the Vietnam War had caused societal rupture 
and the effectiveness of the Viet Cong‟s „primitive weapons‟ against the „American Goliath‟ 
stimulated hope in radical organisations across the world that the existing system was 
vulnerable.14 Groups such as the Weather Underground, the West German Red Army 
Faction (RAF), the Italian Red Brigade, the Japanese Red Army and the French Action 
Directe were activated. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) became the heroic model for revolutionary activism, 
replacing the position once held by the Viet Cong. The strength of the PLO motivated the 
formation of numerous offshoot organisations. Terrorist attacks become more frequent, 
more violent and began to transcend national boundaries.15 The Munich Massacre was the 
peak of this terrorist trend. Rapoport has observed that after the Munich Massacre „for good 
                                                          
12 W. Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999).  See also by Laqueur; A History of Terrorism, (New Jersey: Transaction 
Publishers, 2001); No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century, (Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2004). 
13 D. Piszkiewicz, Terrorism’s war with America: A History, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
2003), p.21. 
14 D. Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism‟, UCLA International Institute, p.56. available 
online, 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf  
[accessed 31/01/2010] 
15 Rapoport, „The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism‟, pp.56-57. 
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reason‟ the term ‟international terrorism‟ was revived and Stefan M. Aubrey, in The New 
Dimension of International Terrorism, has declared the Munich Massacre a „quintessential act 
of international terrorism.‟16  
The terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman in Inside Terrorism has made a similar claim but his 
thesis accentuates the Munich Massacre as „the first clear evidence that even terrorist attacks 
which fail to achieve their ostensible objectives can nonetheless still be counted successful 
provided that the operation is sufficiently dramatic to capture the media‟s attention.‟17 
Expanding on Hoffman‟s point, Brian Jenkins in The Study of Terrorism, has argued that 
terrorism should be defined „by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrator or 
the nature of their cause‟18 and in his article The New Age of Terrorism has isolated the 
distinguishing characteristics of incidents of international terrorism and identified them in 
the Munich Massacre. Understanding the theoretical aspects of modern terrorist attacks 
provides an important backdrop for determining how the Munich Massacre relates to other 
acts of terrorism but it leaves us without a sense of how those attitudes to terrorism were 
actually shaped on a practical as well as conceptual level. 
The second, more neglected, strand of the history concerns international reactions to this 
brutal attack. When the response to the Munich Massacre has been discussed at length, it has 
been viewed primarily through the lens of the retaliatory actions of the Israeli intelligence 
organisation, Mossad. George Jonas‟ pioneering work on the topic, Vengeance, focuses on 
Mossad‟s controversial covert retaliatory attacks known as „Operation Wrath of God.‟19 
Jonas‟ depiction of the Munich Massacre became cemented in the public memory when 
                                                          
16 S. Aubrey, The New Dimensions of International Terrorism, (vdf Hochschulverlag AG, 2004), p.34. 
17 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006), p.73. For Hoffman the Munich Massacre was „the premier example of terrorism‟s power 
to rocket a cause from obscurity to renown.‟ 
18 B. Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems, (Santa Monica: California, RAND 
Corporation, P6563, December, 1980), p.2. 
19 G. Jonas, Vengeance, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). 
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Steven Spielberg adapted Vengeance for his 2005 film Munich.20 His book triggered a number 
of subsequent detailed histories of the covert Israeli response including Aaron Klein‟s 
Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response21 and Simon 
Reeve‟s award winning documentary and book One Day in September the full story of the 
1972 Munich Olympics massacre and the Israeli revenge operation 'Wrath of God.'22 By contrast, 
the response of Israel‟s powerful Cold War ally the United States, has attracted minimal 
attention.  
Many historians including Mark Bowden in Guests of the Ayatollah: the First Battle in America’s 
War with Militant Islam and David Farber in Taken Hostage have overlooked the significance 
of the Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre because of a belief that the 
story of American counterterrorism began in the 1980s when Reagan declared that he would 
rid the world of „the evil scourge of terrorism.‟23 This view is also adopted by Noam 
Chomsky in International Terrorism: Image and Reality. While Chomsky has cautioned that 
there were acts of international terrorism before the 1980s, he states that it was not until the 
1980s that „terrorism became a major public issue‟ when „concern over international 
terrorism reached the level of virtual frenzy.‟24  
The Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre has also been of passing 
interest in studies which survey the strategic and tactical counterterrorism measures 
adopted by the United States government since the 1960s. David Tucker in Skirmishes on the 
Edge of Empire, and G. Davidson Smith in Combating Terrorism  describe the Nixon 
                                                          
20 Munich, Directed by Steven Spielberg, 2005; Universal Studios and Dreamworks Pictures   
21  A. Klein, Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response (Random 
House, 2005). 
22 Reeve, One Day in September, Introduction. 
23 M. Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: the First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly, 2006), p. 597. and D. Farber Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First 
Encounter with Radical Islam, (Princeton University Press, 2006). 
24 N. Chomksy, „International Terrorism: Image and Reality‟, in Alexander George (ed.), Western State 
Terrorism, (Routledge, December, 1991),  available online, 
 http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199112--02.htm#n1 [accessed 17/8/2011] 
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administration‟s counterterrorism measures as historical points of reference for the history 
of American counterterrorism, but both scholars have not comprehensively explored the 
context or ramifications of the initiatives. Kumamoto in International Terrorism and American 
Foreign Relations 1945-1976 has complemented Tucker and Smith‟s studies by highlighting 
some of the contentious political and diplomatic issues faced by the Nixon administration in 
the establishment of international counterterrorism measures25 but without any explanation 
of the rationale behind the establishment of these measures or the process that brought them 
into being. 
Timothy Naftali, director of the Nixon Presidential Library provides one of the most 
comprehensive accounts of the Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre in 
Blind spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism. Naftali, with his relatively 
unfettered access to the primary documentation of the administration, has been able to 
construct a valuable preliminary history of the Nixon administration‟s response to the 
Munich Massacre based around the contextualisation of these sources. Naftali‟s study  
provides the starting-point for this thesis. His analysis is by no means complete however. In 
the opening of Naftali‟s chapter on the Munich Massacre he declares that the attack „finally 
defined the new menace of international terrorism‟26 but does not consider the conceptual 
implications of the Nixon administration‟s response. 
 
This thesis attempts to fill the space between histories of the Munich Massacre as a turning 
point in the history of international terrorism and the conceptual implications of the Nixon 
administration‟s enactment of permanent counterterrorism measures. It links the theoretical 
analysis of the attack with the story of its aftermath, the administration‟s counterterrorism 
                                                          
25 R. D. Kumamoto, International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations 1945-1976, (Northeastern 
University Press, 1999), p.152. 
26 T. Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 
p.54. 
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response to the salient features of the terrorist act itself. It draws together these disparate 
histories of the Munich Massacre, relating them back to the history of American foreign 
policy. 
Part One of this thesis investigates the contextual factors that shaped the Nixon 
administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre. Chapter one focuses on the international 
considerations and how they shaped the Nixon administration‟s initial reading of the 
incident and the subsequent response. It looks primarily at how Nixon and Kissinger‟s 
existing policies toward the Middle-East interfaced with the pressures the Munich Massacre 
placed on American geopolitical and diplomatic interests within the region, which were, at 
the time, significant. 
Chapter Two follows the impact of the Munich Massacre into the domestic sphere. It 
analyses the interplay between the administration‟s Middle-East policy and pressure, 
perceived or real, from various interest groups. The Nixon administration was under 
pressure to balance pro-Israeli pressures with that of the international Arabian-American oil 
companies and a hostile Congress. The importance of dealing with domestic pressures was 
intensified by the pending presidential election. 
Part Two of this thesis takes up the question of how the Munich Massacre became, as Stefan 
M. Aubrey has declared it, a „quintessential act of international terrorism.‟27 It explores the 
relationship between the Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich Massacre and the 
evolving conceptualisation of the terrorist threat. Chapter Three looks at how the prevalence 
of international acts of violence against states necessitated engagement with multilateral 
solutions and how that process provoked contentious international political debate. It 
                                                          
27 S. Aubrey, The New Dimension of International Terrorism, p.34. 
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expounds the rationale behind Nixon‟s appeal to the United Nations and his decision to take 
the fight against terrorism to a global battlefield. 
Chapter Four analyses the Nixon administration‟s introduction of the „Cabinet Committee to 
Combat Terrorism‟; a permanent executive branch which would systematically deal with 
incidents of terrorism.28 It examines the establishment of this unprecedented mechanism and 
its connection to a shift in the conceptualisation of the threat posed by terrorism to America 
and international society. In effect, this thesis aims to identify the features which 
differentiated the Munich Massacre from previous actions and to consider how the Massacre 
contributed to changing the Nixon administration‟s perception of terrorism so substantially.  
This thesis outlines the history of the Nixon administration‟s response to the Munich 
Massacre, the most significant act of non-state violence on behalf of state aims during this 
period. This analysis reveals the manner in which diplomatic intricacies and contextual 
considerations contributed to the conceptualisation of an international terrorist threat and to 
the Nixon administration‟s paradigmatic approach to terrorism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 18, 1972, 
National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Atherton on 
September 14 and cleared by Donelan, Sisco, Armitage, Boyd, Wright, Fessenden, and Ross, p.2.  
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PART I 
QUIET THE ZIONIST RAGE 
 
Chapter ONE 
The Burdened Alliance 
 
 Now, and this thing could turn easily now. My fear is, World War 1 started because the 
Austrians had been frustrated for 15years, had the Archduke assassinated, the Germans 
and the whole world was outraged. And they thought that for once they would have a 
free shot, and they were going to settle the Serbian problem once and for all’.29  
(Henry Kissinger, Sept 1972) 
 
These are the words expressed by Henry Kissinger in response to reports of the 
tragedy unfolding at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. Although imbued with the 
hyperbole for which Kissinger was renowned,30 they beg the question as to the 
contextual issues that stimulated such grave concern over this incident. The Munich 
Massacre was a product of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, a set of hostilities that had 
raged between Israel and the Arab world for decades. United States‟ involvement in 
the Middle-East and any subsequent concern over hostilities in the region were 
primarily associated with Cold War geopolitics. The geopolitical interests of the 
United States had been established after the Second World War, when containment of 
                                                          
29 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings, Conversation 
between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, Conversation 771-2. 
30 W. Isaacson, Kissinger, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), p.211. R. Dallek, R. Nixon and 
Kissinger: Partners in Power, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp.50-51, 102-103. 
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the international Communist threat began to define American foreign policy. The 
United States established relationships with countries in the Middle-East in order to 
ensure access to petroleum resources, lines of communication, and military bases and 
thus deny the Soviet Union similar access.31 Successive American governments 
continued to commit to the objective of securing US interests in the region by keeping 
the Soviet Union out. As the Cold War conflict of powers entered the Middle-East, a 
calculated alliance with Israel emerged.32 When Nixon came to power he continued 
this approach to Middle-East policy and maintained the strategic alliance with Israel. 
In the wake of the Munich Massacre however, the US-Israeli alliance was tested. In 
1972, the geopolitical foundations upon which the alliance was built continued to 
shape American policy toward the Middle-East but responding to the Munich 
Massacre was made complicated by the uncertain detente that Nixon and Kissinger 
had established with the Soviet Union and Nixon‟s overarching foreign policy 
objectives.  
The Nixon administration has been endorsed by historians including Spiegel, Quandt and 
Hahn as a markedly pro-Israeli government. Indeed, William Quandt in his comprehensive 
work on American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli conflict from 1967-1974, Peace Process, 
claims that in 1972, the Nixon administration‟s Middle-East policy „consisted of little more 
than open support for Israel.‟33 Other commentators such as Edward Said emphasise the 
United States resolve to preserve „internal balance‟34 as a mode of maintaining interests. For 
this perception too, cultivating a friendship with Israel had significant strategic value.35 It 
                                                          
31 P. Hahn, Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (Chapel Hill: UNC 
Press, 2004), pp.67-68. 
32 E. Said, US Policy and the Conflict of Powers in the Middle East, Edward Said, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Spring, 1973), p.33. 
33 W.B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press: 2005), p.94. 
34 Said, „US Policy and the Conflict of Powers in the Middle East‟, p.36. 
35 Said, „US Policy and the Conflict of Powers in the Middle East‟, p.36. 
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was the underlying conditions behind the Nixon administration‟s support for Israel that is of 
significance in this context, however. An explication of Israel‟s role in Nixon‟s world-view, a 
construction that defined the overall configuration of his foreign policy structure, will 
elucidate the reasons why the administration attributed such import to the Munich 
Massacre.  
 
The consensus among historians is that for Nixon, Israel was primarily seen as a buffer 
against Soviet expansion in the region. Nixon and Kissinger were not in pursuit of a 
friendship with the Israeli nation but rather to thwart Soviet designs in the Middle-East.36 As 
Gilbert Achcar highlights in his conversation with Noam Chomsky in Perilous Power, during 
this period Israel had acquired the status of „aircraft carrier of the United States.‟37 Nixon 
and Kissinger conceived of the world and the practice of foreign policy through the lens of 
Realpolitik; „that blend of cold realism and power-oriented statecraft that tended to be, to 
use Kissinger's description of Bismarck, "unencumbered by moral scruples."38 Foreign policy 
processes were understood in terms of strength assessment rather than sentiment or 
ideology and objectives were achieved through the manipulation of contending forces.39 
Nixon and Kissinger‟s diplomatic creed resulted in the subordination of Middle-East policy 
to other issues that were considered imperative to the maintenance of their grand 
international strategy.40 Policy pertaining to Israel would have to be compatible with the 
more central elements of their platform and thus, the Nixon administration‟s approach to 
                                                          
36 W.B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967-1976, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977), p.127; H. Kissinger, The White House Years, (Sydney: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1979), pp.618, 631; M. Kalb, and B. Kalb, Kissinger, (Little Brown and Company, 1974), p. 
208. 
37 G. Achcar, and N. Chomsky, Perilous power: The Middle-East and US Foreign Policy:  Dialogues  on 
Terror, Democracy, War and Justice, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2007), p.64. 
38 Isaacson, Kissinger, p.139. 
39 J.L. Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, (Penguin Books, 2006), p. 155. 
40 J. Hoff, „A Revisionist View of Nixon‟s Foreign Policy,‟ Presidential Studies Quarterly, (Winter, 1996), 
Vol. 26, No. 1, p.120. 
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the Munich Massacre would suffer the same fate. 
 
The crux of the Nixon/Kissinger world system was managing the United States‟ 
relationship with the Soviet Union41 and it therefore determined the core of the 
administration‟s policy on the Middle East. In his memoirs, Nixon has explained it thus 
Since US-Soviet interests as the whole world‟s two competing superpowers were 
so widespread and overlapping, it was unrealistic to separate or 
compartmentalise areas of concern. Therefore, we decided to link progress in 
such areas of Soviet concern as strategic arms limitation and increased trade with 
progress in areas that were important to us-Vietnam, the Mid-East, and Berlin. 
This concept became known as „linkage.‟42  
The prioritisation of issues necessitated by the policy of „linkage‟ ensured that for the greater 
part of Nixon‟s first term, the Middle-East was not a contender for top tier policy attention.43 
Indeed, presidential historian, Robert Dallek asserts that when Nixon entered the presidency 
he was adamantly opposed to becoming embroiled directly with the burden of infertile 
Middle-East negotiations.44 The Middle-East was dismissed as a quagmire and as Nixon 
conceded in the statement above, was seen as only one element woven into the network of 
issues constituting his foreign policy platform. Nixon‟s grand plan for his first term in office 
was to enter into an „era of negotiation‟45 a strategy which would enable him to create 
international system where contending powers ensured stability and peace. Such conditions 
would facilitate détente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China and allow for 
                                                          
41 S. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle-East Policy, From Truman to  
Reagan, (University of Chicago Press, 1985), p.170. 
42 R. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: MacMillan, 1978), p.346. 
43 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, p.169. 
44 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, p.169. 
45 R. Nixon, Inaugural address, January 20, 1969, Public Papers of the Presidents, The American 
Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1941. [accessed 17///7/2011] 
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America‟s honourable extrication from Vietnam.46  Joan Hoff, in her analysis of Nixon‟s 
foreign policy platform has appealed his position.   
Nixon could not have equally addressed all diplomatic fronts at once and he 
clearly chose to concentrate on Vietnam, China and the USSR during his first 
term. It made sense for him to have to put the Middle-East on the back burner 
until some of his other foreign policy objectives were achieved.47  
Nixon‟s method of putting the Middle-East on the „back burner‟ was to delegate relevant 
policy decisions to the Department of State. This gave Nixon scope to concentrate on 
Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union. It also meant that the White House was not associated 
directly with the impasse characterising Arab-Israeli settlement negotiations and was, to 
some degree, insulated from denigration of unsuccessful initiatives.48  
 
Nixon was also aware of the potential problems that could arise from having Kissinger 
weigh in heavily on Middle-East policy at this point. This was in part due to his heritage. 
Kissinger grew up a persecuted Jew in Nazi Germany and although Kissinger‟s biographer 
Walter Isaacson has claimed that Kissinger minimised his heritage as an adult49 Isaacson 
also asserts that the holocaust left a „lasting imprint on him.‟50 This claim was also made by 
Kissinger‟s mentor in the US army, Fritz Kraemer. Kraemer said of Kissinger, that despite 
his strength, „the Nazis were able to damage his soul.‟51 Leaving Middle-East policy to the 
Department of State prevented Kissinger‟s personal sentiment from influencing decision 
making. As Nixon told Haldeman, 
                                                          
46 J. Hanhimaki, „An Elusive Grand Design‟ in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations 1969-1977, 
Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (eds), (New York, Oxford University Press: 2008) p34. 
47 Hoff, „A Revisionist View of Nixon‟s Foreign Policy,‟ p.120. 
48 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, p.171. 
49 Isaacson, Kissinger, p.26. 
50 Isaacson, Kissinger, p.29. 
51 Fritz Kraemer, May 14, 1988, quoted in Isaacson, Kissinger, p.29. 
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Anybody who is Jewish cannot handle Middle-East policy. Henry might be as 
fair as he can possibly be [but] he can‟t help but be affected by it. Put yourself in 
his position. Good God… his people were crucified over there. Jesus Christ! 
Five-six million of them popped into big ovens! How the hell is he to feel about 
all this?52  
Nixon was sympathetic to Kissinger‟s overall reading of the Arab-Israeli conflict but he did 
not want the public relations problems inherent with having someone of Jewish descent 
involved in the determination of policy towards Israel. He was content for Secretary of State, 
William Rogers, to handle Middle-East policy and pursue his initiatives for the moment.53 
In the wake of the Munich Massacre, the ambivalence that Nixon adopted towards Middle-
East policy was altered abruptly by the provocative nature of the attack both militarily and 
diplomatically. The Munich Massacre was a trigger for the White House to focus direct 
attention on the Middle-East, taking over the primary responsibility for policy from the 
Department of State. The Munich Massacre marked the advent of a renewed and 
comprehensive engagement with the Middle-East policy initiatives.54 Kissinger‟s 
comparisons with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand prior to the First World War, and the 
hell that followed this event as a result, illumines not just the significance of the attack for 
the administration but also the core driver of early policy response. The Nixon 
administration feared that the Munich Massacre could prompt a substantial conflict in one 
of the most volatile regions in the world. The slaughter of Israeli citizens in such a blatant 
manner was strong justification for Israeli aggression against the Arab states.  
In a phone call between Nixon and Kissinger on 6 September, 1972, both men acknowledged 
the probability that rage fuelled vengeance would shape any Israeli response and that it 
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could manifest in hasty, provocative and disproportional retaliatory action.55 „I don‟t want 
them to go conquer Beirut,‟ Nixon said to Kissinger. „I don‟t mind them going in and 
knocking off a few camps, but even that‟s bad right now.‟56 Vengeance had become 
characteristic of the Israeli response. Israeli reprisals for attacks committed by activist Arab 
liberation organisations throughout the course of the Six Day War, the War of Attrition and 
other smaller skirmishes stemming from the Arab-Israeli conflict had been extensive.57 An 
editorial comment in Israel‟s most popular newspaper Ma‟ariv illustrated the Israeli resolve 
on the issue of national retribution. 
The time has come for a major stocktaking, settling the one and only account we 
have with the guerrillas and the dispatchers… we shall hit them at home. We 
shall settle our account with them and their dispatchers, with those who 
sheltered them in Munich, assisted them in infiltrating their Olympic Village and 
bringing their weapons there 58 
Golda Meir had also fearlessly declared in an address to Knesset (Israel‟s Legislature) that 
„we will smite them wherever they may be‟59 and Chief of Staff, General Elezar spoke of 
Israel waging a „continuous war‟ not one „started today and finished tomorrow‟ using „many 
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and various means.‟60 The CIA took these threats seriously and noted in the Weekly Review 
that Tel Aviv had declared „open season on the fedayeen.‟61 
Of immediate concern was an attack on Lebanon.62 Kissinger predicted that Israel was 
planning an incursion into Lebanon to detain the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation.63 Nixon and Kissinger decided that Israel would have to be restrained. The 
risk of serious conflict was too great and both Nixon and Kissinger were worried that the 
long term historical alliance between America and Israel could lead to a presupposition of 
US military support.64 Kissinger, particularly, was concerned that the environment was ripe 
for Israel to initiate a war with Arab world, telling Nixon that „They are in the best position 
they‟ve ever been in. No Russians there.‟65  Egyptian President, Anwar al-Sadat had ordered 
a surprise exodus of Soviet advisers from Egypt in mid July, 1972 and re-established 
Egyptian control over military installations.66 As Kissinger observed, the exit of the Russians 
from Egypt provided Israelis with an improved position from which to execute their 
reprisals and for Israel, the brutality of the Munich Massacre was justification for a severe 
revenge attack.67  
Nixon and Kissinger felt it was imperative that Israel be encouraged to proceed with 
caution; the United States could not become embroiled, in any capacity, in another messy 
                                                          
60 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 15 September, 1972, Weekly Review, „After Munich‟, available 
online, http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000656074/DOC_0000656074.pdf [accessed 
17/8/2011] 
61 CIA, 15 September, 1972, Weekly Review, „After Munich‟. 
62 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, 
Conversation 771-2. 
63 T. Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 
p.56. 
64 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, 
Conversation 771-2. 
65 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, 
Conversation 771-2. 
66 A. Al-Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography, (Sydney: Williams Collins Publishers, 1977), 
p.230. 
67 NARA- NMP, Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, September 6, 1972, 
Conversation 771-2. 
22 
 
war. They were still struggling with the process of extricating the United States from 
involvement in Vietnam. The Vietnam War had dominated policy discussion in America 
throughout Nixon‟s first term and strongly influenced Nixon and Kissinger‟s foreign policy 
designs. Nixon unequivocally relates the primacy of the issue in American political affairs in 
his memoirs stating that „a settlement in Vietnam was the key to everything.‟68 Domestic and 
international unrest over American involvement in the war was proving detrimental to the 
resolution of peripheral issues69 and in response to building pressure on 25 July, 1969 Nixon 
announced the introduction of the „Nixon Doctrine.‟70 The core tenet of the doctrine was that 
the United States would „furnish military and economic assistance when requested in 
accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened 
to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.‟71  
 
With the Nixon Doctrine, the administration espoused a non-interventionist set of principles 
but regardless of the doctrinal rhetoric, both Nixon and Kissinger recognised that the 
Munich Massacre had the potential to draw America into an undesirable conflict in the 
Middle-East. The perils of the region were an existing concern for the Nixon administration. 
Nixon had commented in an interview in 1970 that the Middle-East was „terribly 
dangerous‟. Suggesting, like Kissinger, that it was akin to „the Balkans before World War 
One- where the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, could be drawn into a 
confrontation that neither of them wants because of the differences there.‟72  
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Any suggestion of an increase in American support of Israel as a result of the Munich 
Massacre would likely reactivate the Soviet Union‟s relationship with the Arab states.73  
Despite the exodus of Soviet advisers from Egypt, the Soviet Union continued to have 
significant interests in the Arab world. Brezhnev saw the Middle-East as part of a global 
strategy. Moscow had fostered strategic alliances with Arab states throughout the 1960s as 
part of „calculations relating to East-West relations.‟74 According to Galia Golan in Soviet 
Policies in the Middle-East, Brezhnev, considered the Middle-East a „convenient vehicle for 
Soviet competition with the West and an easy one for providing aid, especially in arms in a 
way the US was unwilling to provide to either side of the conflict at that time.‟75 When Israel 
achieved a swift victory against the Soviet proxies- Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the Six Day 
War in 1967, David Kimche in The Last Option: the Quest for Peace in the Middle-East, has 
claimed that that for Brezhnev, Israel‟s success was „a personal humiliation which had to be 
avenged.‟ Brezhnev was resolute that the outcome of the Six Day War would not diminish 
hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis and instituted a policy of total confrontation, 
waging an aggressive six year war against Israel.76 Moscow continued to provide massive 
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quantities of supplies to Egypt and Syria throughout 1972 even after Egyptian President 
Sadat had expelled Russian advisers from Egypt in July that year.77 Kimche claims that  
by the early 1970s both Egypt and Syria, bolstered by the massive military aid 
which Brezhnev had so generously bestowed upon them, were ready to start the 
countdown for their next war with Israel. This time it, however, it would be a 
very different affair from the previous debacle in 1967, because the Soviet Union 
was to be involved in all planning and preparatory stages78 
Rami Ginat and Uri Bar-Noi also claim that the Soviet Union engaged in the funding of 
Palestinian terrorist groups throughout much of this period.79 In this climate, Nixon and 
Kissinger did not want to antagonise the Soviet leadership.  
 
At the time of the Munich Massacre, the United States and the Soviet Union had accepted a 
„détente‟ or „easing of tensions‟ but the volatility of the Middle-East meant that there was a 
constant risk of conflict in the region. Altercations on the periphery also impacted negatively 
on negotiation processes. The „linkage‟ that was the core of the Nixon/Kissinger Cold War 
foreign policy canon meant that if any element in their interconnected web of issues started 
to corrode, the process was undermined.80 They could not damage their hitherto diplomatic 
progress with the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger had been encouraged by 
advancements during the Moscow and Beijing Summits but were patently aware that the 
relationship possessed an underlying instability as a consequence of its essentially hostile 
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foundations.81 A significant resurgence of conflicts in the Middle-East could ignite the deep 
set antagonisms at present dormant in the Cold War rivalries. The Munich Massacre was a 
potential trigger for a war in the Middle-East. Controlling a belligerent Israel was the key to 
retaining international stability and ensuring continued progress on negotiations. The Nixon 
administration would have to develop a series of measures which would contain Israeli 
anger and diminish the risk of igniting further conflict.  
In the first instance, the suffering of the Israeli people had to be recognised. Nixon conveyed 
his sympathies to Prime Minister Golda Meir directly.  
Dear Madame Prime Minister: 
The heart of America goes out to you, to the bereaved families and to the Israeli 
people in the tragedy that has struck your Olympic athletes. This tragic and 
senseless act is a perversion of all the hopes and aspirations of mankind which 
the Olympic Games symbolize. In a larger sense, it is a tragedy for all the 
peoples and nations of the world. We mourn with you the deaths of your 
innocent and brave athletes, and we share with you the determination that the 
spirit of brotherhood and peace they represented shall in the end persevere. 
Sincerely, 
RICHARD NIXON82 
In his correspondence with Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, Nixon made the assurance 
that the United States „was working diligently on the terrorist problem.‟83 The 
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administration also engaged in careful discussion over how to demonstrate American 
sympathy for Israeli losses. Kissinger stated in a Memorandum to Nixon that the gesture 
had to convey „meaning‟ and „human compassion‟ but in political terms, it had to 
unambiguously relate the American position without involving „the presidency of the 
United States in an official act.‟84 Secretary of State, William Rogers suggested that period of 
silence during the funeral of the Israeli athletes would be appropriate. In his 
communications with the Israeli government, Rogers had been informed by Ambassador 
Rabin that the Israeli government did not want high level delegations present at the funeral 
as it would make the event overtly political.85 
 
Beyond symbolic displays of grief and compassion, discussion in the White House centred 
on designing a practicable response that would serve American interests. Nixon and 
Kissinger knew it was essential to communicate that the administration was dismayed and 
concerned by the tragedy yet there must be a concerted effort to contain rather than fuel the 
outrage felt by Israelis. They felt The American-Israeli alliance must be maintained but also 
exist concurrently in a system of international and domestic dynamics conducive to 
American interests. Nixon and Kissinger recognised the strategic value of utilising the 
United Nations; it could appease the Israelis and simultaneously buy the administration 
time to design a longer term response to the issue.86 The President instructed Secretary of 
State, William Rogers, to „see what sort of game plan we can come up with for the UN.‟87 
The Department of State expressed initial reservations on the utilisation of the UN for this 
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issue but Nixon and Kissinger were adamant that it could prove valuable in their diplomatic 
strategy.88  
Nixon, Kissinger and Rogers communicated closely with Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin 
in devising an official course of action. Records of conversations between Ambassador Rabin 
and Secretary of State, William Rogers show that the Israeli government voiced firm 
opposition to any overtures toward the United Nation‟s Security Council.89 Ambassador 
Rabin instead encouraged the United States government to put pressure on those states with 
known associations and support mechanisms for Arab terrorist groups.90 Rabin suggested 
that America address Cairo, Beirut and Damascus and make it patently clear that if these 
governments were prepared to condone the use of their territory by anti-Israeli terrorist 
groups or as proxy battlegrounds for actions in other states, they would have to bear 
responsibility.91 Rabin also suggested that the United States government engage with 
western European countries to promote effective actions against Arab organisations with 
known connections to terrorist groups and establish security systems with the express 
purpose of exchanging views on terrorist acts.92 Aside from the difference of opinion on the 
value of utilising the UN, many of Rabin‟s aforementioned suggestions were viewed as 
reasonable by the administration.  
 
Yet, the outrage felt by the Israeli government also manifested in impracticable propositions 
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which would not be acceptable under global conditions at this time. The primary point of 
divergence between the two nations was on the continuation of the Olympic Games. The 
Israeli government was applying pressure to the United States government to announce 
their withdrawal from participation in the remainder of the Games as a show of support.93 
Memoranda from the Department of State show that the notion of withdrawal was 
unanimously rejected by the primary decision makers: Nixon, Kissinger, Rogers and General 
Haig.94 Nixon was irritated by the Israeli pressure to withdraw from the Olympic Games 
and grumbled to Kissinger,  
It‟s like these assholes that tried to stop us running the government. … If we‟d 
stopped like some of the softheads around here or gone over and prayed at the 
Lincoln Memorial, that‟s what they want. So the thing to do is to do it the other 
way.95  
To consent to Israel‟s proposed course of action would present multiple problems for 
American relations with friendly states. The administration worried that withdrawal from 
the event would be damaging to relations with West Germany. The Germans were already 
under intense scrutiny due to the flawed rescue attempt at the NATO airbase and, at that 
time, were seen as a positive force in the region.96 Rogers also argued that cancellation of the 
Olympic Games would send the wrong message to terrorist groups and would be exploited. 
The Black September Organisation had already declared the attack a victory and as evidence 
that the world was not in support of Israel.97 Rogers raised concerns that it would give 
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credibility to other planned actions by the terrorist organisations.98 Maintaining control over 
the public relations problem was central to keeping the situation from becoming further 
inflamed. 
There was also disagreement within the administration. A matter of contention between the 
Department of State and the White House was the impact the Munich Massacre would have 
on peace settlement negotiations in the Middle-East. The Department of State viewed the 
crisis as an opportunity to resume negotiations with the Israeli government on the terms of a 
settlement.99 Representative from the Department of State, Sam Hoskinson stated that the 
administration should „ identify with Israeli sorrow and bitterness, but it would not be in 
our interest to do this in a way that closes off our options to work with both Arabs and 
Israelis to produce a peace settlement.‟100 Nixon was wary of the pushing settlement talks on 
the Israelis in the wake of this tragedy, however.101 He was convinced that the situation in 
Munich would not diminish resolve on the part of Israel but would rather fortify their 
position.102 Rabin had conceded that „after Egyptian expulsion of Russians there seemed to 
be a sense of relaxation and broadening of chances for peace‟ but that after the Munich 
Massacre „things were taken back to where they were.‟ Rabin highlighted the fact that with 
the existence of Arab terrorist groups like the Black September Organisation „who could 
guarantee to Israel that once there was a political settlement that Israel would not be in a 
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worse position?‟103 Key decision makers in the administration concluded that it would be 
prudent „to keep a lid on things for the present.‟104 
An analysis of documents pertaining to the initial response of the Nixon administration to 
the Munich Massacre shows that the principal concern was the containment of Israel. This 
undermines the general endorsement amongst many historians of wholesale American 
support for the Israel throughout much of this period. The volatility of the region meant that 
the US-Israeli alliance was subject to the flexibility that strategy formulation in an 
antagonistic Cold War world required; the notion of US support for Israel had to have some 
fluidity and restrictions. The Munich Massacre produced an international relations 
conundrum for the United States; the historical alliance with Israel was fundamental to 
American interests in the Middle-East, yet an open endorsement of support for Israel would 
rouse a possible resurgence of hostilities and would place the United States in a precarious 
position. The administration realised poor diplomacy could bring to the fore those sensitive 
issues lying suppressed within the system. Retaliation from Israel would send shivers 
through the lines of US interests existing within the web of diplomacy, which had so far kept 
the Cold War from becoming „hot.‟  
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Chapter TWO 
Domestic Unrest 
 
You really don’t know, Henry, what the Jewish community will do on this.  
It’s going to be the goddamnedest thing you ever saw…105 
(Richard Nixon to Henry Kissinger, 6 Sept, 1972) 
 
The Nixon administration‟s policies toward the Middle-East in the wake of the Munich 
Massacre would not just have international ramifications. The entanglement of the 
international sphere with the domestic sphere was a matter of serious consideration in the 
formation of the United States‟ foreign policy, particularly on the question of Israel. 
Balancing the interests of the two spheres was difficult to achieve. Domestic and foreign 
policy were awkward bedfellows during Nixon‟s administration, primarily due to his and 
Kissinger‟s prioritisation of issues. Both have proclaimed in various articles and books 
penned since their time in the White House, that they were first and foremost world 
statesmen106 and were concerned principally with the conduct of foreign affairs. Nixon 
remained relatively uninspired by the domestic enterprise. He saw domestic issues as 
obstructive to his designs on the world stage107 and attempted to conduct foreign and 
domestic policy completely independent of each other. In his memoirs, Kissinger justified 
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this conduct as an effort to protect policy making from the passions of everyday 
partisanship.108 For the American people, it simply appeared that Nixon and Kissinger had 
unashamedly and consistently prioritised issues of foreign policy above domestic issues. In 
the words of a Time Magazine article written in 1972 „it does not seem to be Nixon‟s nature 
to offer bold leadership at home.‟109  
The Munich Massacre was a provocative foreign policy issue however, and Nixon‟s distaste 
for domestic policy was tempered by his almost purely pragmatic approach to politics, a 
predilection he shared with Kissinger. Robert Dallek, in Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in 
power, claims that both Nixon and Kissinger knew that in order to succeed in responding to 
international affairs, they had to appease Congress and the media, and still appeal to public 
opinion. They did not, as Dallek has noted „intend simply to reflect domestic sentiment‟ but 
„were mindful of the need to enlist back by all possible means, including stealth or 
misleading information, for any major foreign policy initiative.‟110 This was particularly true 
during a presidential election campaign. In September 1972, the Nixon administration‟s 
campaign was in full-swing and serious engagement with domestic issues was inevitable 
because it was, and continues to be, an area where elections are won and lost.111  
 
As has been considered in the first chapter of this thesis, Nixon and Kissinger‟s Middle-East 
policy calculations were ostensibly informed by the conception of the region in terms of 
global strategy. Engagement with domestic pressures was clearly unavoidable however. The 
administration‟s Middle-East policy was particularly vulnerable to pressure from the pro-
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Israel lobby, a sector of American society that Robert H. Trice has defined as „seventy-five112 
separate organisations-mostly Jewish-that actively support most of the actions and policy 
positions of the Israeli government.‟113 The actual influence possessed by the Jewish 
community and the pro-Israel lobby in the formation of foreign policy is a matter of some 
contention. According to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt they have allegedly formed a 
powerful, vocal and committed sector of American society. In the controversial book The 
Israel Lobby and Foreign Policy, Walt and Mearsheimer claim that the Jewish community have 
manipulated the lobbying process that occurs within the United States system of democracy 
with great success.114 Steven Rosenthal, too, has claimed in Long distance nationalism, 
American Jews, Zionism and Israel, that „since 1967, there has been no other country whose 
citizens have been as committed to the success of another country as American Jews have 
been to Israel‟.115 George Schultz116 in The ‘Israel Lobby’ Myth and Abraham Foxman in The 
deadliest lies: the Israel lobby and the myth of Jewish control, refute many of the claims of Walt 
and Mearsheimer, but have conceded that various Jewish groups in America do have 
political influence and largely advocate US support for Israel. Schultz and Foxman insist, 
however that that the Jewish groups do not constitute a homogenous lobbying group within 
American society.  They contend that governmental support for Israel has come from 
agreeance among the American people and the Democratic and Republican parties that to 
pursue pro-Israeli policy is „politically sound and morally just.‟ They claim that American 
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support for Israel is the result of geopolitical factors and the moral imperative of Israel as a 
homeland for the Jews.117 
Despite contention over the degree of clout held by Jewish groups in relation to the 
formation of foreign policy, the pertinent factor is Nixon‟s perception of their power and 
their objectives. On this matter there is little disputation. Nixon was convinced of their 
prominent position within American society. He believed that the Jewish community had 
formed a powerful cohesive group in American society, which displayed disloyalty toward 
the American nation (sometimes referring them as „Jewish traitors‟) and had a high level of 
involvement in the American media, which made them „dangerous adversaries.‟118 Recently 
surfacing from the Nixon Tapes is a conversation that took place between the president and 
Reverend Billy Graham in February 1972. During this conversation Nixon candidly 
expressed his concerns regarding Jewish media penetration, declaring that „Newsweek; it‟s 
all run by Jews and dominated by them in their editorial pages… The New York Times, The 
Washington Post; totally Jewish too.‟119 David Greenberg, in Nixon’s Shadow, has contended 
that Nixon made no effort to conceal his detestation of what he labelled the „liberal media‟ 
even embarking on a „crusade‟ against the American press.120 According to Nixon‟s speech 
writer, William Safire, Nixon had once had told him that „the press is the enemy… to be 
hated and beaten‟121 and that it was „a biased, out of touch liberal elite.‟122 After the Munich 
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Massacre, Nixon‟s perception of the media was conspicuous during a meeting with 
Kissinger, Rogers and Haig. Nixon used it as additional evidence that the administration 
should not capitulate to Israeli pressure and the desires of the broader Jewish community, 
commenting that to withdraw from the Olympic Games „would be the New York Times 
approach.‟123  
Nixon believed that Jewish groups considered the interests of Israel to be of far greater 
importance than any other issue and regarded this intense preoccupation with some 
distaste. In 1969, Nixon declared to fellow White House administrators that „under no 
circumstances will domestic political considerations have any bearing on the decisions I 
make with regard to the Mideast.‟124 Historian, Dominic Sandbrook has claimed that the 
„domestic political considerations‟ Nixon referred to most particularly, was Jewish support 
for Israel.125 Nixon‟s relationship with this sector of American society was not as clear-cut as 
it seems, however. Remarks captured on the „Nixon Tapes‟ and documented in the records 
show an unequivocal antipathy towards the Jewish community which have motivated many 
overzealous historians to label Nixon an anti-Semite.126 Nixon‟s advisor, H. R. (Bob) 
Haldeman has recounted an incident in his diaries where Nixon identified the enemies of 
the government as „youth, black, Jew‟ and recalls him stating in an Oval Office meeting that 
„most Jews are disloyal… generally speaking, you can‟t trust the bastards. They turn on 
you…‟127 Yet it should also be noted that Nixon appointed Kissinger to the second most 
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powerful post in the administration and also selected many other figures of Jewish heritage 
to serve in important positions. Nixon‟s counsel, Leonard Garment countered claims of 
Nixon‟s anti-Semitism saying that on a scale of one to one hundred he would rate him 
„somewhere between fifteen and twenty-better than most, worse than some, much like the 
rest of the world.‟128  
 
Although many of Nixon‟s remarks have revealed an underlying hostility toward the Jewish 
community, it is important to acknowledge that the first term of his presidency also 
coincided with a particularly intense period of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Walt and 
Mearsheimer claim that as a corollary to heightened tensions in the Middle-East caused by 
the War of Attrition during 1969-1970 and attacks like the Munich Massacre, concern over 
the security of Israel reinforced and intensified the Israel-centric view of many Jewish 
community-relations groups.129 Nixon‟s remarks, although improper, are also a reflection of 
resentment towards increasing demands to display strong support for Israel. Nixon‟s 
sentiments toward the Jewish community were also a product of his belief that they were 
principally sympathetic to the Democratic Party and he was thus reluctant to court the 
Jewish vote.130 In The White House Years, Kissinger reported that Nixon „considered himself 
less obligated to the Jewish constituency than any of his predecessors had been and was 
eager to demonstrate that he was impervious to its pressures‟.131 „The small percentage of 
Jews who voted for him, he would joke, had to be so crazy that they would probably vote 
for him even if he turned on Israel.‟132 Kissinger also claims that Nixon rarely practiced that 
which he preached. „For on almost all practical issues his unsentimental geopolitical analysis 
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finally led him to positions not so distant from ones others might take on the basis of ethnic 
politics‟.133 Any personal resentment would become secondary to political pragmatism.  
Nixon‟s pragmatic approach to politics was particularly evident during the 1972 election 
campaign as emerging political conditions began to turn in his favour. The presumptive 
nominee for the Democratic Party, George McGovern caused some apprehension amongst 
the Jewish community.134 There was some uncertainty about McGovern‟s commitment to the 
security of Israel.135 Nixon although generally disliked by the Jewish community, was 
considered to have shown his wherewithal in relation to the support of Israel. Thus Nixon, 
like a modern-day Dostoevsky,136 assumed the paradoxical position of being labelled an 
anti-Semite, yet the preferred candidate because he was considered an ardent supporter of 
Israel. This was an electoral advantage that Nixon would not neglect to capitalise upon and 
he revised his earlier reluctance to cater to the Jewish vote. Nixon recognised that the 
American Jews were a key political constituency. He felt that their antagonistic views 
towards his administration could be ameliorated through strategic political manoeuvring. 
Salim Yaqub has highlighted a host of domestic and international concerns that emerged 
throughout the 1970s such as crime, busing and the mistreatment of Soviet Jews which 
prompted many people in the Jewish community to question their traditional liberalist 
ideology.137 This provided the Republican Party with an opening, a chance to increase its 
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support within the Jewish community and its share of the Jewish vote.138 The development 
of this important facet of Nixon‟s electoral game plan would best be served by showing 
measured partiality to Israel after the tragedy in Munich. Yaqub has emphasised how a 
display of support for Israel would lead the Israeli government to effectively endorse Nixon 
for re-election, and the support would filter through to the American Jewish community. 139 
Merely showing partiality for Israel was problematic, however. The Munich Massacre had 
inspired intense anger in champions of the Israeli cause and many pro Israeli groups were 
making unreasonable demands and using violent and vengeful language. The New York 
Times, reported that members of The Jewish Defense League had engaged in a hunger strike 
at the West German Embassy in Washington and the National Chairman Bert Zweibon 
issued a statement that the United States and the broader community were guilty of being 
„the silent witness of Arab barbarity‟. The League made claims that Syria, Iraq, Egypt and 
Lebanon „harbor, train and finance‟ Arab „butchers‟ and that retaliation should take the form 
of „the assassination of Arab diplomats all over the world‟.140 In response to the protests of 
the Jewish community, Nixon complained to Kissinger „the trouble with the Jews is that 
they‟ve always played these things in terms of outrage.141 The Nixon administration had to 
subdue the Jewish community‟s indignation but not give any sense that the administration 
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was unconditionally pro-Israel. There was firm opposition within the administration to 
letting American policy be dictated by an outraged and radical Jewish community.  
The Nixon administration decided that the Jewish Community‟s outrage would best be 
calmed by a public acknowledgement of their anguish; with a delicate and measured 
display of compassion. Secretary of State, William Rogers, proposed that Nixon issue an 
executive order for a national day of mourning, perhaps even flying flags at half mast.142 
Rogers‟ proposal was rejected out of hand however as it was considered by Nixon and 
Kissinger to be letting policy be dictated by the „radical Jewish community.‟143 The Munich 
Massacre was one of many tragic incidents taking place on the world stage at the same time 
and Nixon and Kissinger felt that it must be placed within international perspective. They 
stressed that Ireland was facing a near civil war which should not be reduced in import by 
efforts to appease an outraged Israel. „Why don‟t you order the flag when some Irish 
nationalists get killed?‟ Nixon queried in response to Rogers‟ proposal. „What will Irishmen 
say if you didn‟t lower it when the school children got killed in Belfast…?‟144 Both Nixon and 
Kissinger felt that by lowering the flag, the administration would be demonstrating a double 
standard. But it was merely a matter of getting the level of conciliation right. „We‟ve got to 
show we care on this one‟ Nixon acknowledged in a private phone call to Kissinger. „You 
really don‟t know, Henry, what the Jewish community will do on this. It‟s going to be the 
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goddamnedest thing you ever saw‟.145 Kissinger felt that the administration should be 
particularly cautious when appeasing the Jewish community however warning Nixon that  
It‟s not our day of mourning, Mr President. It‟s easy enough now to do a number 
of grandstanding… And also, God I am Jewish. I‟ve had 13 members of my 
family killed. So I can‟t be insensitive to this. But I think you have to think also of 
the anti-Semitic woes in this country146  
 Running parallel to the competition in the Middle-East between the Arab world and Israel 
was a similar clash within the United States lobbying system. Both constituencies possessed 
significant internal domestic leverage.147 Since the Six Day War, major Arab-American 
international oil companies had been increasingly pushing for Arab support from the 
American government.148 Representatives of the international oil companies in America 
were being pressured by their Arab partners to become more aggressive in their articulation 
of Arab interests. The consortium of companies forming the Arabian American Oil 
Company (ARAMCO)149 were particularly forthright in expressing their discontent stating 
that „the image of the US has more or less collapsed in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war‟ and that „as a direct consequence of our [American] identification with Israel, Soviet 
influence in the Middle-East-which was practically non-existent in the mid fifties-has 
burgeoned.‟150 Although American oil interests in the Middle-East did not become pressing 
until 1973 when the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) 
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proclaimed an oil embargo,151 the United States had implemented measures to ensure 
accessibility to Middle-East oil in the tightly integrated energy market since World War 
Two. The United States built friendly relations with many Arab states and prevented any 
one state from establishing hegemony in the region, establishing a local balance of power. 
This strategy would ensure that Middle-East oil would not become the possession of 
unfriendly states and would dissuade hostile states from obstructing oil flow.152  
Nixon continued these efforts to form good relationships with the major international oil 
companies. Such amicable relations were reflected in the significant campaign contributions 
Nixon received in the run-up to his 1968 election win and the generous contributions he 
received throughout 1971 and 1972.153 Even so, Nixon and Kissinger were not substantially 
influenced by Arab-American oil interests in the formation of Middle-East policy.154 An 
executive of the Mobil Oil Company remarked that „we could always get a hearing, but we 
felt we might as well be talking to the wall‟. Despite their largesse, the major international 
oil companies had limited influence in Washington during this period.155 For the most part, 
the major international oil companies did not apply significant pressure throughout Nixon‟s 
first term, however. They recognised the benefits of tending to their interests independently 
of the government as a means to prevent poor publicity or get involved in messy 
diplomacy.156  
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Admittedly though, the impact of terrorist attacks like the Munich Massacre was the cause 
of some apprehension. The implications of the Munich Massacre and more specifically, any 
indication of US support for Israel had the capacity to cause severe disruption to business 
interests. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, American businesses in the Middle-
East had been subject to multiple terrorist attacks from Fedayeen groups aiming to obstruct 
Western access to Arab oil.157 Kissinger, in a memo to Nixon, outlined his concerns that in 
the wake of the Munich Massacre radical Arab terrorist groups would be inspired to engage 
in a campaign of destruction aimed at businesses perceived as representing US 
imperialism.158  
there is no doubt that the Fedayeen groups have carried out coordinated attacks 
against US business firms and the likelihood is for increased terrorist actions 
against both official and private US interests over the next several months in the 
light of the Arab guerrilla‟s belief that the Black September Organisation‟s 
Munich operation was a success 
Terrorist attacks of this nature would interrupt transit and communications in through the 
region.159 Nixon‟s claim that he was not impeded by domestic constraints was not 
necessarily reflected by reality.  
 
The United States Congress was also a terminal difficulty for Nixon, particularly in his 
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pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Sandbrook has described Nixon‟s relationship with 
Congress as „simply dreadful‟.160 When Nixon had taken office in 1969, he was the first 
President since 1853 to have done so without a majority in either the House of 
Representatives or the Senate. The democratic majorities obstructed Nixon‟s policy 
initiatives frequently, a situation worsened by the fact that he was loath to cultivate 
relationships with congressional Democrats and Republicans alike.161 Nixon took pains to 
conceal his foreign policy intentions from Congress believing that he was in a better position 
to deal with international issues. In President Nixon: Alone in the White House, Richard Reeves 
has claimed to have viewed a handwritten note by the president which reveals the extent to 
which he considered himself responsible for the conduct of foreign policy processes. The 
note read 
Foreign policy = strength… 
Must emphasise - Courage.  
Stands alone… 
Knows more than anyone else.  
Towers above advisers. World Leader162  
 
Nixon felt that Congress was „cumbersome, undisciplined, isolationist, fiscally irresponsible, 
overly vulnerable to pressures from organised minorities and too dominated by the 
media‟.163 In the wake of the Munich Massacre, Congress was a beast that he would have to 
deal with, despite his reservations. The righteous anger of Jewish Americans over the attack 
on innocent Israelis was increasingly filtering into congressional policy debates. Nixon had 
concerns over Israeli links in the United States Congress exploiting the tragedy in Munich as 
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a rallying point for voicing objections to US-Soviet détente.164 There was already significant 
criticism coming from both the left and the right of Congress over Nixon and Kissinger‟s 
policy of détente with the Soviet Union. In August, 1972 Leonid Brezhnev had imposed the 
„diploma tax‟ on would-be emigrants to combat the growing emigration of Soviet Jews to the 
West. The policy caused great offence within the American Jewish community and 
throughout the world.165 Noam Kochavi, in Insights Abandoned, Flexibility Lost: Kissinger, 
Soviet Emigration and the Demise of Détente’ observed that after the tragic events of the 
Munich Massacre it would appear justified for Israel to pressure the administration on 
emigration rights for Soviet Jews. There would be a Congressional push from members with 
links to Israel for emigration rights to be made a feature of détente with the Soviet Union.166 
The Munich Massacre had considerable political reach, it had the potential to threaten Nixon 
and Kissinger‟s highly prioritised initiative of US-Soviet détente. 
As was consistent with Nixon and Kissinger‟s overarching foreign policy approach, political 
pragmatism determined how the domestic affects of the Munich Massacre were managed. 
The administration‟s decisions in the international field were tempered by domestic 
obligations and vice versa. As in almost all of Nixon‟s policy calculations, the position the 
administration would adopt when dealing with the American Jewish community would be 
determined by a manipulation of contending forces based on power assessment rather than 
sentiment or ideology. The overriding concern in relation to the Munich Massacre was 
containing Israeli ire and, as in the international sphere, the Nixon administration sought to 
show measured support for the Jewish Community without endorsing unreasonable action. 
The administration could not show open partiality for the domestic Jewish population as it 
would be read as support for Israel internationally. Support for American Jews would anger 
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the same constituencies as an open display of support for the nation of Israel and have 
similar international ramifications. Maintaining the precarious balance was made more 
complicated by other domestic constraints such as Arab-American business interests, 
Congressional concerns over Soviet Jewish emigration and the pending presidential election. 
For Nixon, it was simply a matter of manipulating these issues so that the administration 
could continue to pursue their foreign policy objectives and preserve national interests.  
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PART II 
ROUSE THE GLOBAL WRATH 
 
Chapter THREE 
International Condemnation 
 
 
O men of arms, why do you love injustice? 
You must live in law and order 
Get up, wake up, or be forever regretful, 
Don't be infamous among the nations167 
 (Yemeni poet, Amin al Mashreqi) 
As Part One of this thesis has illustrated, containing Israel was integral to US interests both 
in the international and domestic spheres. There was also another dimension to the Munich 
Massacre that had to be addressed; the international nature of the attack. The Arab-Israeli 
conflict had gone beyond state boundaries in deliberate and frightening way. It had been 
thrust into the homes of millions of people around the world and had incited fear and anger 
in the international community. The Munich Massacre was the most visible and brutal 
exemplar of a new but increasingly prevalent phenomenon of international political attacks. 
Most commonly manifesting in hijackings, the Nixon administration and broader 
international community had to determine how to effectively deal with transnational 
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offences. The Nixon administration recognised that the Munich Massacre, as such a visible 
act of international terrorism, would require an equally visible international response. An 
appeal to the United Nations to engage on the issue of international terrorism and denounce 
the actions in Munich would also speak to their Israel problem. It would allow the United 
States to show a degree of support for Israel without involving America directly. The use of 
multilateral institutions also had the potential to fuel controversial international politics 
however. 
Although little study has been undertaken on Nixon‟s perception of, and interaction with, 
the United Nations,168 Edward Keefer has observed Nixon‟s general aversion to seeking 
multilateral solutions in achieving his foreign policy objectives. Keefer asserts that in 
Nixon‟s realist view of international relations „national self-interest and major power 
relations were the only real considerations for foreign policy.‟169 In 1971, Nixon offered his 
blunt opinion in a private conversation with the American Ambassador to the People‟s 
Republic of China, Walter McConaughy saying 
I‟d just say to hell with the UN. What is it anyway? It‟s a damned debating 
society. What good does it do? Very little…. They talk about hijacking, drugs, the 
challenges of modern society, and the rest of it is to give hell to the United 
States.170 
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Nixon‟s thinly veiled anti-UN sentiment stemmed from his assessment of the United 
Nations as an „old institution‟ he considered „obsolete and inadequate‟ and „set up to deal 
with a world of twenty years ago.‟171 According to Jeremi Suri in Henry Kissinger and the 
American Century, Kissinger had a better sense than Nixon of how engagement with the 
international community could benefit the United States. Kissinger was aware of the limits 
of unilateral power and promoted the idea of a world system where power was dispersed 
hierarchically allowing for „more centres of decision.‟172 This system would produce terms 
favourable to the United States; it would encourage innovative diplomatic conduct between 
states and promote consensus building while legitimising America‟s role as a world 
superpower.173 Suri has explained that within Kissinger‟s „federalist‟ approach to foreign 
relations, the United States was the central diplomatic actor in a community of states; the 
international mediator.174 Kissinger rejected both the imperialist impulse for a single state‟s 
dominance over a distant landscape and at the other extreme, the assumed equality of all 
nations in an institution like the United Nations General Assembly‟.175 Keefer and Suri have 
observed that Nixon and Kissinger recognised the value of the United Nations in monitoring 
ceasefires, separating parties in conflict and passing resolutions reflecting decisions already 
made in other less public channels176 but this did not dissuade the two men from their 
general aversion to the institution. Nixon and Kissinger‟s lack of enthusiasm for the United 
Nations should be contextualised however.  
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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the United Nations underwent a series of major changes 
both in orientation and in membership. The UN engaged in active promotion of 
decolonisation and as a result, an influx of newly independent states gained a political voice 
within the forum.177 Paul Kennedy, in The Parliament of Man has observed that the „world 
community‟ became predominantly African, Asian and Latin American. The former colonies 
dominated both in population and in General Assembly votes.178 The newly independent 
states also brought their own set of agendas to UN debates. Kennedy has claimed that the 
existing systems became subject to broad criticism and as a corollary, there was a significant 
increase in anti-Western sentiment.179 The United Nations was also weakened by financial 
pressures, mounting claims of institutional impotency and an ongoing but ultimately 
unsuccessful campaign to keep the People‟s Republic of China out of the assembly. China 
gained membership in 1971.180 According to Peter Romaniuk in Multilateral Counterterrorism, 
preoccupation with these issues meant that although there was a surge of international 
terrorist activity and hijackings throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, terrorism was not 
addressed in any considerable way by the United Nations.181 This is not to say that the 
terrorist acts throughout this period were not deemed significant by the international 
community or by the Nixon administration however. In 1969, in his address before the 24th 
Session of the General Assembly, Nixon stated that „there are at least five areas in particular 
of great concern to everyone here with regard to which there should be no national 
differences, in which our interests are common and on which there should be unanimity.‟ 182 
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One of these five areas was „securing the safety of international air travel.‟ Nixon went on to 
say 
By any standards, aircraft hijackings are morally, politically, and legally 
indefensible. The Tokyo Convention has now been brought into force, providing 
for prompt release of passengers, crew, and aircraft. Along with other nations, 
we also are working on a new convention for the punishment of hijackers. But 
neither of these conventions can be fully effective without cooperation; sky 
piracy cannot be ended as long as the pirates receive asylum. Consequently, I 
urge the United Nations to give high priority to this matter. This is an issue 
which transcends politics; there is no need for it to become the subject of 
polemics or a focus of political differences. It involves the interests of every 
nation, the safety of every air passenger, and the integrity of that structure of 
order on which a world community depends.183 
In 1970, in Organisation of American States (OAS) policy discussions, the need for an 
international approach to the terrorist problem was acknowledged in a number of 
recommendations. These recommendations included: specific condemnation of the acts 
(which would include hijacking), member states facilitation of the extradition of terrorists, 
the establishment of an international instrument declaring terrorist acts international crimes 
plus an appeal to the international community to condemn such acts and those countries 
and organisations maintaining connections with terrorist elements.184 Even though Nixon 
had urged for the terrorist issue of hijacking to be prioritised in 1969 and again in 1970, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2236#axzz1Vbtqfy3T [accessed 10/8/2011] 
183 Nixon, Address Before the 24th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 
18, 1969, PPP, The American Presidency Project. 
184 Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President‟s 
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 24,   1970, U.S. Department of 
State. 
51 
 
was not until a more potent example of terrorism confronted the international community 
that dealing with the threat became urgent. The Munich Massacre filled that void. 
For Nixon, the Palestinian violence exemplified in the attack in Munich was „precedent 
setting.‟ It was an indication of a shift in the psyche of the terrorist. Terrorist elements had 
demonstrated that they would go to considerable lengths, including killing civilians in 
blatant sight of the world to pursue their agenda.185 Nixon heatedly denounced the terrorists 
as „international outlaws‟ stating that „they are unpredictable and all the rest.‟186 The 
overriding concern of the Nixon administration continued to be the prevention of Israeli 
retaliation but Nixon also recognised that the world faced a formidable security challenge. 
The anarchic nature of the threat necessitated the enactment of preventive measures in order 
to thwart any future attacks on vulnerable targets. This was a job for the United Nations. 
Nixon and Kissinger recognised that by appealing to the international community to 
condemn the attack and debate the establishment of international security measures, the 
United States could also show Israel that they were sympathetic to their position without 
jeopardising national interests.187 
Early discussion of the utilisation of the United Nations met with firm opposition from the 
Department of State. Secretary of State, William Rogers held the view that obtaining 
effective measures against incidents of international terrorism through an UN Security 
Council Resolution would likely be greeted with negligible success. Rogers noted that the 
strength of the loss would send a clear message as a win for the terrorist cause, which would 
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work against their own interests and promote terrorist confidence.188 Department of State 
officials were also concerned that utilisation of an institution like the UN could „exacerbate 
rather than ease‟ tensions arising from the attack. The airing of Arab grievances within 
debate would likely intensify Israeli embitterment and could potentially be used as 
justification for Israel to engage in an independent action.189 The Israeli government had also 
voiced their reluctance to make any moves toward engagement with the UN. Rogers 
believed that direct contact with Israel was likely to bear more fruit in terms of 
negotiations.190 Officials from the Department of State were also conscious that the United 
Nations was increasingly being criticised as an impotent institution. They worried that a 
failed resolution would be yet another demonstration of its limitations.191 Samuel Hoskinson 
of the National Security Council staff told Kissinger that  
the hard reality, however, is that there is really very little we, or any major 
power, can do to rectify this situation or make sure that it will not happen again. 
We can attempt to focus world moral indignation and press for tighter 
international security measures but we will remain vulnerable to the dedicated 
extremist192 
Nixon‟s actions mirrored Hoskinson‟s advice. He made moves toward focussing world 
moral indignation and pushed for the implementation of international security measures. 
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Nixon issued a presidential directive to „mobilise the international community to take action 
to combat terrorism in the wake of the Munich tragedy.‟193  
Nixon was also prompted to push for some sort of action to be taken against those Arab 
states condoning the existence of terrorist forces in their territories. It was clear to the 
President that his administration, and the international community would have to act 
decisively on this issue and put measures in place to secure the safety its citizens. Since 
September 1970, in the wake of Arafat‟s expulsion from Jordan, when Lebanon accepted the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation use of Lebanese territory, Nixon had been becoming 
increasingly frustrated with Arab states that provided safe havens for terrorist elements.194 
Nixon declared in a phone call to General Haig that „we have to be awfully tough… any 
nation that harbours or gives sanctuary to these international outlaws we will cut off 
economic support.‟195 Kissinger also suggested to Nixon that they should push the UN to 
enact „some international rules on harbouring guerrillas and so forth. That is a concrete 
measure that affects the world. That‟s a statesmanlike thing.‟196 The administration began 
immediate consultations with the Ambassadors and Charges of almost fifty countries in 
order to solicit additional views and suggestions on the problem of international terrorism 
and to manoeuvre the international voice to condemn those nations complicit in the efforts 
of terrorist groups.197 Despite the Department of State‟s reluctance, Nixon was adamant in 
his desire to pursue the UN line of strategy. „It will be good to put the goddam UN on the 
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spot. We want to put them on the spot on this issue, because we think we got them by the 
balls here.‟198 
Nixon cast aside his aversion to the United Nations and embraced its value as a mechanism 
for condemnation of the Munich Massacre but for this approach to be viable, he needed to 
get the support of the world community. Nixon recognised that any American appeals to 
Arab governments to confront terrorism on their own soil were hampered by the perception 
that America was in Israel‟s hip pocket. Nixon therefore designed a diplomatic strategy to be 
carried out by the Department of State in an order to circumvent the problem. Nixon 
directed Rogers to encourage nations with the capacity to provide more leverage over Arab 
states to vocalise their concerns.199 These nations should make clear to the leaders of Arab 
states that the credibility of Arab governments was diminishing as they consistently failed to 
denounce or deal with terrorist attacks. The international community had no reason to 
believe the innocence of Arab governments when those who executed the attacks carried 
Arab passports, were based in Arab states and expressed their views from Arab capitals.200 
Rogers should also encourage these friendly nations to advise Arab leaders that the vague 
position they adopted towards terrorism was causing detriment to their national interests; it 
tarnished their international image201 and dominated their policy dialogue making it captive 
to terrorist issues.202 Finally, they should emphasise the fact that the Munich Massacre and 
similar attacks raised antagonisms within the Middle-east and rendered any movement on 
peace settlements redundant. So long as a terrorist war was maintained on Israel, there 
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would be brutal counter attacks and any diplomatic efforts by Arab states would be deemed 
insincere.203  
The Nixon administration would also capitalise on the outrage building among international 
community.204 Denunciations of the terrorist actions were coming from around the globe. On 
the morning after the attack, the New York Times reported that „people spoke of it to 
strangers on street corners, expressing horror. A taxi driver, forgetting to complain about 
Paris traffic for once, turned to his fare and said, in summing up the general feelings, “But 
they‟re crazy; the world is going crazy.”205 King Hussein of Jordan called it a „horrible crime‟ 
in a message to Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany. Stating that „In the name of the 
Jordanian government and people, I convey to you our affliction and our anger at this act of 
violence perpetrated against the civilised world‟, that it was the work of sick minds who are 
opposed to humanity, the Palestinian people and Jordan and opposed to Arabism, its 
traditions, its values and its cause.‟206 Dr Cynthia Wedel, president of the National Council 
of Churches said that „until this abuse of human freedom disappears from the world scene, 
it is imperative that effective security measures be maintained so that international meetings 
may be encouraged and continued without the threat of such atrocities.‟207 Condemnation 
came from the Vatican too as it described the attack as „a betrayal of the Olympic spirit and 
an unjust injury to the West German Government.‟208 An editorial on the front page of 
L’Osservatore Romano, said that the attack had broken the political truce traditionally 
                                                          
203Circular Telegram 164986, Washington, September 9, 1972, 2334Z, NARA, RG 59, Central Files 
1970-73, POL 23-8.   
204 Telegram 169556 From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations, September 15, 
1972, 2354Z, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential; Routine. 
Repeated to 21 additional posts. Drafted by Armitage, and cleared by De Palma, Stevenson, Atherton, 
and Sisco.  
205 „Leaders around the World Express Horror at the Guerrilla Attack at Olympics‟ by Martin Arnold, 
New York Times, Sept 6, p19. 
206 New York Times, Sept 6, p19. 
207 New York Times, Sept 6, p19. 
208 New York Times, Sept 6, p19. 
56 
 
represented by the Olympic Games.„209 The Jewish Service Organisation, B‟nai B‟rith made a 
statement that „the murderers and barbarism are not isolated acts but are a repeated 
consequence of the over and tacit support and encouragement, and the comfortable 
sanctuary which Arab governments have given to terrorist groups.‟210 
In a memorandum to Nixon, Rogers reported that the actions which had been taken with 
other governments had been successful in „imparting a sense of urgency‟ on the terrorist 
issues within the international community and that efforts would be made by the 
Department of State to maintain the momentum that had been generated. Rogers informed 
Nixon that focus had shifted to designing a strategy for the United Nations General 
Assembly where the issue of terrorism was expected to be a priority item.211 On September 
8, 1972 Waldheim appealed to the international community that the UN could not be a 
`mute spectator' to the acts of terrorist violence and proposed that an item be included in the 
27th General Assembly to address the growing problem of international terrorism. The item 
was entitled „Measures to Prevent Terrorism and other forms of violence which engender or 
take innocent human lives or Jeopardise Fundamental Freedoms.‟212 The motion was 
encouraged and welcomed by the Nixon administration.213 In order to emphasise the level of 
importance the United States government attributed to the terrorist issue, Rogers focussed 
on the issue of international terrorism in his opening address to the United Nations General 
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Assembly and encouraged the foreign ministers of other nations to do the same.214 On 25 
September, 1972, when Rogers addressed the 27th UNGA, he said of the terrorist threat 
The issue is not war-war between states, civil war or revolutionary war. The 
issue is not the strivings of people to achieve self-determination and 
independence. Rather, it is whether millions of air travellers can continue to fly 
in safety each year. It is whether a person who receives a letter can open it 
without the fear of being blown up. It is whether diplomats can safely carry out 
their duties. It is whether international meetings-like the Olympic Games-like 
this assembly-can proceed without the ever –present threat of violence. In short, 
the issue is whether the vulnerable lines of international communication-the 
airways and the mails, diplomatic discourse and international meetings-can 
continue, without disruption, to bring nations and peoples together. All who 
have a stake in this have a stake in decisive action to suppress these demented 
acts of terrorism.215 
The US circulated a Draft Convention to the assembly which they proposed would „deal 
with the dangerous recent trend to internationalise terrorism and civil violence as evidenced 
in the recent Munich tragedy.‟216 The United States outlined the intention of the Convention 
as a mechanism which would identify acts of political violence „both outside the State of 
nationality of the perpetrator and outside the State against which the act is directed‟. The 
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draft also stipulated that for an act to be covered under the Convention it would have to 
have been directed against civilians rather than at armed forces during military conflict.217  
Within the scope of the covered acts the Convention then declares that anyone 
who unlawfully kills, causes serious bodily harm or kidnaps another person 
commits an offense of international significance. State party to the Convention 
would be required to extend their jurisdiction over such offenses, make such 
offenses crimes punishable by severe penalties, and to extradite or prosecute 
alleged offenders found in their territory218 
The Draft Convention did not endeavour to establish an internationally accepted definition 
of „terrorism‟ however. In preparation of the draft, Nixon had noted in his correspondence 
with Rogers that to dwell on the matter of definition at that point would impede progress on 
dealing with the terrorist acts and focussing on „the common interest of all nations in 
preventing the spread of violence from areas involved in civil or international conflict‟ 
would better serve the issue.219 Categories of offences would be identified which could be 
condemned by all states regardless of ideological persuasion or alliance status.220 As Rogers 
outlined in his address to the General Assembly, the political aspect would become 
secondary to the protection of innocent lives or preventing the disruption of processes 
necessary for the effective function of relations between states. The offences that would be 
condemned were „hijacking and sabotage of civil aircraft; kidnapping and assassination of 
foreign diplomats and other foreign officials; and the export of international terrorism to 
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countries not involved in the underlying conflicts.‟221  
 
The Nixon administration had carefully worded the resolution in order to prevent it 
becoming, what Romaniuk has described as, „a lightning rod of dissension‟ but were 
ultimately unable to avoid the political potency of the document. While there was significant 
support from many UN member states for the United States proposals, various legal and 
political impediments emerged in the ensuing debate in the assembly‟s legal committee. 
Some representatives expressed reservations as to viability and utility of the American 
approach, stating that a secure and exact definition of terrorism was required. American 
diplomat Joseph Sisco and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization 
Affairs, Samuel De Palma claimed that many African states, with the encouragement of a 
selection of Arab states, twisted the argument to take a lofty position on issues such as „the 
inalienable right to self-determination‟ and „the legitimacy of national liberation 
struggles.‟222 The delegates claimed that genuine liberation movements would be labelled 
„terrorism‟ by the regimes they challenged. Bruce Hoffman in Inside Terrorism has observed 
that according to these delegates any condemnation of „terrorism‟ in the UN was, in essence, 
an endorsement of the status quo whereby the powerful could continue to subjugate the 
weak.223  
The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, William Tapley Bennett Jnr noted that 
there were also several Arab states that resented the proposals and rejected them, sensing 
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that their own states were the targets of the criticism.224 Within this disputatious minority, 
there were states openly condoning and championing the use of terrorist methods as an 
integral part of their revolutionary philosophy.225 In other cases, commercial and political 
interests prevented governments from taking a firm stance and further, many countries 
articulated their attachment to the historically traditional legal institution of diplomatic or 
territorial asylum.226 According to Ambassador Bennett the discussion was effectively 
derailed by a group of delegates who concluded that to address „terrorism‟ was to neglect 
dealing with the root cause of the phenomenon. These delegates claimed that terrorist acts 
were simply a reflection of the subjugation of liberty and social injustices caused by military 
occupation, loss of territory, poverty and lack of human rights and that until the sources of 
discontent were eradicated, any international legal measures would be ineffective.227 
Ambassador Bennett noted the criticism of the developed world that underscored this 
argument; that the suffering of the peoples of the „Third World‟ was of limited interest until 
terrorist elements internationalised their violent acts and threatened the security of the 
developed world.228  
The American proposals to the UN were dependent upon broad international approval and 
uptake of the obligations outlined in these treaties but the issue of terrorism was infused 
with so many political agendas that the legal and humanitarian aspects were overpowered.  
Although there was a widespread sense of horror amongst the international community in 
relation to the Munich Massacre, the United States encountered significant difficulties (at the 
27th Assembly) in drawing together such disparate sovereign states to uphold a cohesive 
                                                          
224 W. Tapley Bennett Jnr, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism’, 
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4, (1973), p.758. 
225 Bennett Jnr, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism’, p.758. 
226 Bennett, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism,’ p.753. 
227 A. Goswami, Combating Terrorism: The Legal Challenge, (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2002), 
p.57. 
228 Bennett, „US Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism,’ p.759. 
61 
 
approach. When the resolution emerged from extended debate and negotiation, the United 
States voted against it, declaring it impotent in preventing acts of terrorist violence and 
ineffective in addressing the terrorist problem.229 What is significant however is that despite 
the failure to establish any concrete measures within this forum, there was conviction from 
the international community to pursue the issue beyond the 27th Assembly. An ad hoc 
committee, which the United States was prepared to serve on,230 was established to continue 
the process, leading up to the 28th General Assembly.231 
Although originally motivated by the pragmatic political concern of containing Israel, 
Nixon‟s overtures towards the United Nations in response to the Munich Massacre, 
constituted a noteworthy step in the history of counterterrorism. The prevalence of acts of 
international terrorism in conjunction with Nixon‟s fondness for the manipulation of 
international issues had inspired him to brush aside his aversion to the use of multilateral 
solutions in foreign policy. The Nixon administration‟s utilisation of the United Nations 
became the crux of a diplomatic strategy that would tend to US interests while at the same 
time allow strong denunciation of terrorist attacks like the Munich Massacre. They brought 
the fight against terrorism to the global battlefield by exploiting the network of antagonisms 
and interests defining state relations.232 Although there was a clear divergence of views 
within UNGA, the inclusion of the item and the debate that ensued marked the first time 
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that the international community had grappled with the terrorist issue seriously and as a 
united community.233  
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Chapter FOUR 
The New Terrorism 
 
The Nixon administration had brought the fight against terrorism to the global battlefield; 
they had stimulated international debate and simultaneously made in-roads into addressing 
their primary concern of preventing Israeli retaliation. However, Nixon considered the 
containment of Israel of such integral importance to national interests and the stability of the 
world system that he felt it necessitated a complementary line of attack in the domestic 
sphere. At the same time as pursuing his efforts in the UN, the President formed the 
„Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.‟ The Cabinet Committee was a permanent 
executive branch which would coordinate information sharing between US security 
departments, solicit counterterrorism suggestions from other nations and systematically 
manage issues of terrorism. It was pivotal in the preparation of the draft resolution which 
was submitted to the 27th United Nations General Assembly but would also function as a 
domestic counterterrorism force which would ensure the security of the American nation 
and its people. The Cabinet Committee would indicate to the world, and most particularly 
to Israel, that America was committed to fighting against the proliferation of terrorist acts 
like the Munich Massacre.  
 
Beyond the political rationale however, the establishment of a permanent executive branch 
to fight terrorism revealed a fundamental shift in the administration‟s conceptualisation of 
terrorism. The attack in Munich was not an isolated terrorist event. The Nixon 
administration had been facing acts of „terrorism‟ since its very first days in office. Within 
the first five weeks, Nixon had to deal with the seizure and diversion of nine American 
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commercial aircraft (and three from various other nations) to locations in Cuba.234 The 
hijackings caused minimal concern within the White House however. These acts of terrorism 
were not initially considered to pose a significant threat to either national or international 
security. A frequent occurrence since the early 1960s, hijackings were predominantly 
committed by American citizens who wanted, for various reasons, to make their way to 
Cuba.235 In response to the hijacking epidemic, the American government simply put 
procedures in place in order to minimise inconvenience. The American government, the 
American people, the airlines and the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) considered 
hijackings during this period to be an irritating disruption to air travel but they were not 
deemed a serious threat. Naftali suggests that Americans viewed the incidents as „something 
akin to bad weather in Chicago.‟236  
 
At much the same time, Nixon‟s administration was confronted by countless acts of 
domestic terrorism which occurred as a result of an American society in flux and plagued by 
significant civil unrest. The civil rights movement had swept through the United States and 
had incited significant dissent and anarchy amongst large sectors of the population. Some 
black liberation groups, most notoriously the „Black Panther Party,‟ engaged in protests, 
typified by guerrilla warfare against the police, factional feuds between rival groups and 
many racially motivated attacks.237 Strong opposition to American involvement in the 
Vietnam War and ambivalence toward the values of the existing system also motivated 
various left-wing political extremists such as the „Weather Underground‟ to engage in 
                                                          
234 „Memorandum from the President‟s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President 
Nixon,‟ Washington, February 7, 1969, US Department of State. 
235 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006), p.67. 
236 T. Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 
p.37. 
237 C. Hewitt „The Political Context of Terrorism in America: Ignoring Extremists or Pandering to 
Them‟, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 12, Issue 3-4, 2000 Special Issue: The Democratic 
Experience and Political Violence, p.331. 
65 
 
violent actions across America, often using bombings as the preferred mode of attack.238 
Nixon condemned these as acts of „revolutionary terrorism.‟ He remarked angrily to 
Kissinger that „they are reaching out for the support- ideological and otherwise- of foreign 
powers and they are developing their own brand of indigenous revolutionary activism.‟239 In 
his various speeches to his constituents across the country the President spoke of „a rising 
tide of terrorism, of crime, and on the campuses of our universities we have seen those who 
instead of engaging-which is their right-in peaceful dissent, engage in violence.‟240 A 
revolutionary wave, David Rapoport claims in The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, had 
swept through the developing world and the Western heartland.241 During Nixon‟s first 
term in office, the proliferation of the violent actions of radical political organisations and 
the frequency of hijackings steadily increased but Nixon continued to deal with the various 
manifestations of terrorism, domestic and international by way of reactive policy.242 The 
attacks were considered to be an irritating inconvenience but not a serious threat. In the 
words of historian Timothy Naftali, they were an „annoying little gnat that buzzed around 
the superpower while it was trying to handle truly dangerous matters.‟243 It was these 
                                                          
238 Hewitt „The Political Context of Terrorism in America: Ignoring Extremists or Pandering to Them‟, 
p.331. 
239 Dallek, R. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), p.208. 
240Remarks in the Ohio State House, Columbus, Ohio. October 19, 1970 Public Papers of  the 
Presidents, The American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2738 
Remarks at East Tennessee State University. October 20, 1970 Public Papers of the Presidents, The 
American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2748  
Remarks in Kansas City, Missouri. October 19, 1970 Public Papers of the Presidents, The American 
Presidency Project, Richard Nixon, Online by Gerhard Peters and  John T. Woolley, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2744 [accessed 17/7/2011] 
241 Rapoport, D. ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism‟, UCLA International Institute, p.56. available 
online, 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf 
[accessed 31/01/2010] Rapoport claims that the development of the „new left‟ wave of terrorism was 
resultant of „enormous ambivalence about the values of the existing system‟ and that the „terrorists‟, 
as well as many outside observers, saw themselves as „freedom fighters.‟ 
242 S. H. Teahan, „Nuisance to Crisis: Conceptualising Terrorism during the Nixon Administration‟, 
unpublished MA thesis, University of Waterloo, 2008, p 60. 
243 Naftali, Blind Spot, p.68. 
66 
 
incidents; the bombings, the hijackings and the violent crime that initially shaped Nixon‟s 
conceptualisation of „terrorism.‟ 
 
The revolutionary ethos common to the majority of the terrorist groups was infectious 
however and throughout late 1969 and 1970, there was a sharp increase in the number of 
serious hijackings.244 These attacks were predominantly executed by the PLO (Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation) and one of its offshoot organisations, the PFLP (Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine).245 Of particular significance was the hijacking of TWA 
(TransWorldAirlines) flight 840. This was the first hijacking incident where Palestinian 
hostility was specifically directed at an American target and it was the first incident that 
grabbed the full attention of the Nixon administration.246 In conjunction with the increase in 
serious hijackings there was also a shift in terrorist methods. The hijackers of TWA flight 840 
were specifically targeting passengers on the aircraft they claimed were „responsible for the 
death and misery of a number of Palestinians.‟247 Terrorist groups began to go beyond 
simply diverting the aircraft, they engaged in hard line political statements. As G. Davidson 
Smith has observed, „terrorism began to emerge as a tactic of politically motivated dissent 
and militancy.‟248 The nationality of the airline was no longer a primary consideration; the 
aircraft was simply a mechanism to be exploited in the pursuit terrorist goals. Innocent 
civilians would be taken hostage and threatened if demands were not met.249 Rapoport has 
claimed that terrorist organisations began to employ a new logic whereby the act became a 
form of punishment as well as a strategy in the pursuit of particular objectives.250 The 
frequency of hijackings throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s was cause for the Nixon 
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administration to principally equate terrorism with hijackings but with the terrorists 
employing a new and dangerous logic, the administration began to re-evaluate the methods 
for dealing with these incidents.  
 
Nixon started to utilise the power of the international voice. As was noted in Chapter Three 
of this thesis, Nixon appealed to the 24th United Nations General Assembly in 1969, to give 
„high priority‟ to the issue of „sky piracy.‟251 He also rallied support for several historic 
international conventions addressing civil aviation.252 Under pressure from the Nixon 
administration, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) achieved the 
ratification of The Tokyo Convention253 and the Hague Convention254 and introduced the 
Montreal Convention.255 There was only modest commitment to these measures however as 
an incident had not yet occurred which posed a fundamental threat to either international or 
American security. The Munich Massacre changed this. Although the revolutionary ethos of 
the Black September Organisation was ultimately consistent with that of many earlier 
attacks, the Munich Massacre also possessed particular features which distinguished it as a 
new class of threat and prompted Nixon to mobilise the world community to fight against 
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the menace of terrorism. 
 
Brian Jenkins, in The New Age of Terrorism has emphasised the terrorist‟s determination to 
internationalise their struggle. The Black September Organisation executed an operation that 
not only transcended the national frontier, but deliberately and brutally violated the sacred 
international precinct of the Olympic Games.256 Jenkins has highlighted how attracting 
international attention, ensured that the terrorists were able to gain leverage over various 
institutions and provide them with a strong position for making their demands.257Jenkins 
and Bruce Hoffman in Inside Terrorism also stress the manner in which the Black September 
organisation exploited the surge in technological advancements that took place in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Terrorist groups were furnished with a whole new suite of weapons and 
mechanisms to use in their operations.258 Recognising how dramatic events, particularly 
involving innocents could scare governments into communicating directly with them for 
fear of being held responsible for the potential loss of life, the terrorists were able to 
manipulate the ubiquity of television, communications satellites, advanced recording 
equipment and international news networks. The Black September Organisation was able to 
reach a worldwide audience instantaneously.259 Their incursion into the Olympic Village 
and their capture of the Israeli athletes was comprehensively broadcast throughout the 
world which increased the impact and terror of their attack and raised the profile of their 
cause.260 As Peter Taylor observed in States of Terror: Democracy and Political Violence „an 
estimated 900 million persons in at least a hundred different countries saw the [Munich] 
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crisis unfold on their television screens.‟261  
 
The Munich Massacre had successfully internationalised the violence stemming from the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Over a quarter of the world had been watching in horror as the Black 
September Organisation executed an attack on a historical symbol of international unity and 
reconciliation.262 Stefan Aubrey has said of the Munich Massacre, 
 
the particularly despicable act of terrorism against a previously immune target 
group violated all the norms of theretofore-terrorist behaviour... A previously 
sacrosanct mould was broken in Munich, allowing the bar to be raised on 
acceptable levels of violence employed by terrorist organisations against non 
combatants and the resultant casualties incurred.263  
 
The blatant violation of state boundaries along with the brutality and visibility of the 
Munich Massacre had caused the international community to feel as if they, not just the 
Israelis, were vulnerable to attack. In his account of the incident in One Day in September, 
Simon Reeve claims that with their actions in Munich, „the Palestinians had changed the 
rules of conflict‟264and thus the rules of reply were also altered.  
 
As Rapoport states, „for good reason, the abandoned term, „international terrorism‟ was 
revived after the attack in Munich.265 Up until that point, the term „international terrorism‟ 
and significantly, the term „counterterrorism‟ had not formally entered the Washington 
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lexicon.266 The new language being used by the Nixon administration indicated not only a 
shift in the methods of terrorist elements but also a turning point in the development of the 
conceptualisation of terrorism. Nixon had moved on from simply conceiving of terrorism as 
either hijacking or a policing issue. Terrorism was a threat that defied borders and 
established norms; it was unpredictable and dangerous.267 Nixon declared that 
 
The use of terror is indefensible. It eliminates in one stroke those safeguards of 
civilisation which mankind has painstakingly erected over the centuries. But 
terror threatens more than the lives of the innocent. It threatens the very 
principles upon which nations are founded… If the world cannot unite in 
opposition to terror, if we cannot establish some simple ground rules to hold 
back the perimeters of lawlessness, if, in short, we cannot act to defend the basic 
principles of national sovereignty in our own individual interests, then upon 
what foundations can we hope to establish international comity?268  
 
Nixon recognised that the response would have to be multifaceted; the threat could not 
simply be tamed by reactive policing, appeasing various constituencies or making broad 
denunciations at the UN. Nixon was not an idealist; he believed that „idealism without 
pragmatism is impotent. Pragmatism without idealism is meaningless. The key to effective 
leadership is pragmatic idealism.‟269 Any action taken in response to the new international 
threat would have to be consistent with the administration‟s interests. It would be a product 
of the intersection of world interests, national interests and the interests of Nixon and 
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Kissinger. 
 
The exigency of dealing with the issue of terrorism intensified when Nixon accessed 
information from an unorthodox source. A psychic Nixon occasionally consulted, Jeanne 
Dixon, prophesied a major terrorist attack on American soil, targeting either an Israeli 
official or a prominent American political figure.270 This odd source caused domestic 
security concerns to make their way to the fore of the post-Munich discussion. The alliance 
between the United States and Israel became strained as a result of the alleged threats to 
American security. Nixon began to view Israeli actions as responsible for creating the 
conditions whereby the United States had become acutely vulnerable to a terrorist attack.271 
The Nixon administration‟s relationship with Israel was already under pressure as Israel 
exploited its links within Congress to push Nixon on the issue of the free emigration of 
Soviet Jewry and undermine the easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Nixon resented Israeli efforts to manipulate the tragedy in Congressional debates in 
order to pursue their anti-détente agenda.272  
 
US-Israeli tensions were further exacerbated, on September 8, 1972 when the Israeli air force, 
despite Nixon‟s efforts to mollify and prevent belligerent reprisals, executed strikes on ten 
bases in Syria and Lebanon. During this operation, three Syrian jets were shot down, the rail 
line between Syria and Beirut was bombed and destroyed and some 200 civilians lost their 
lives.273 These attacks were followed a week later by an Israeli incursion into southern 
Lebanon where the homes of 130 suspected PLO operatives were destroyed. 274 Nixon 
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became increasingly frustrated with the intransigence of the Israelis. Despite his irritation, 
Nixon recognised that if there was risk to United States security as a result of circumstances 
resulting from the Munich Massacre he was under an obligation to protect American 
citizens and foreign diplomats in the United States. He contacted General Haig to find out 
whether the FBI had contingency plans for dealing with a significant terrorist attack on 
American soil.275 Nixon‟s newfound domestic concerns were still seen by Kissinger as 
secondary to the threat posed by an Israeli military overreaction276 but Nixon was convinced 
of the validity of his new threat assessment. 
 
We have got to have a plan. Suppose they kidnap [Israeli Ambassador] Rabin, 
Henry, and demand that we release all blacks who are prisoners around the 
United States, and we didn‟t and they shoot him?... What, the Christ, do we do? 
We are not going to give in to it… We have got to have contingency plans for 
hijacking, for kidnapping, for all sorts of things that [could] happen around 
here277 
 
It was as a remedy to both concerns that Kissinger suggested the establishment of a highly 
visible domestic institution created with the express purpose of fighting terrorism. A 
„gesture‟ indicating that the United States was ready to engage in a systematic approach to 
counterterrorism would both appease the Israelis and concurrently stall the Jewish 
community‟s anti-détente drive.278 Nixon felt that the establishment of prominent 
counterterrorism institution could be useful beyond placating Israel and the American 
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Jewish community. Nixon wanted the highest level membership on the committee not „a 
bunch of jerks from State‟ he told Kissinger.279 On September 25, 1972, Nixon circulated a 
Memo to the heads of nine different governmental departments and agencies and informed 
them of his plan to establish an interagency counterterrorism institution that would, 
according to Nixon, serve as the world leader in combating the international menace. The 
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism‟ was formed. Its five key functions would be to 
 
1) Co-ordinate among the government agencies, ongoing activity for the 
prevention of terrorism. This will include such activities as the collection of 
intelligence worldwide and the physical protection of US personnel and 
installations abroad and foreign diplomats, and diplomatic installations in the 
United States.  
2) Evaluate all such programs and activities and where necessary recommend 
methods for their effective implementation.  
3) Devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that 
occur  
4) make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget concerning proposed funding of such programs, 
           5) Report to the President, from time to time, concerning the foregoing.280 
 
The Cabinet Committee would be headed by Nixon‟s Secretary of State, William Rogers 
with the broader membership comprising the Secretaries of Treasury, Defense and 
Transportation, the Attorney General, the US Ambassador to the UN, the Director of the 
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CIA, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Henry Kissinger), the 
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and the Acting Director of the FBI.281 Nixon 
expressed to the heads of these departments and agencies that he considered the terrorist 
problem to be of the utmost importance and urged them to act efficiently in their respective 
efforts to deal with this international concern.282 The main objective of the Committee would 
be to consider effective solutions to the prevention of domestic and international terrorist 
acts while also becoming a leading force in the establishment of procedures that would 
enable the government to react swiftly, appropriately and efficiently to terrorist acts. The last 
point would be considered in concert with the governments of others states and 
international organisations. The Cabinet Committee‟s first task would be to prepare the draft 
resolution on terrorism for the 27th United Nations General Assembly. 
Nixon ordered each of the contributing departments and agencies to be „fully responsive to 
the requests of the Secretary of State and assist him in every way in his efforts to coordinate 
government wide actions against terrorism.‟283  
 
Nixon also pushed for movement on House legislation for the protection of foreign officials 
in the US, action on the air piracy bill S2567 and implemented a series of new measures in 
dealing with foreign visitors to the United States. The existing program, which allowed up 
to 600 000 visitors annually to stay on American soil for ten days without prior authorisation 
or screening if they claimed they were in transit was deemed inadequate and was 
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scrapped.284 On September 27, 1972, it was replaced by a program stipulating that foreign 
travellers (excepting Canadians) must be in possession of a visa in order to be granted entry 
into the United States. These measures were implemented alongside „Operation Boulder,‟ 
the purpose of which was to create a system of safeguards preventing foreign terrorists or 
terrorist sympathisers from gaining entry into the United States. Any travellers from Arab 
countries who sought visas had to submit to a five day waiting period. The waiting period 
also applied to nationals coming from territories with known active terrorist 
organisations.285 Nixon also implemented a system for screening the names of applicants 
against CIA, FBI, INS and Secret Service records before issuance of the visa. The INS also 
provided the FBI with a list of the names and locations of Arab students of concern living 
within the United States at that time.286 The American government took pains to send the 
message to the American people and the international community that it was taking action 
against the terrorist menace. 
 
Nixon‟s tour de force, the „Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism‟ only ever had one 
official meeting but as G. Davidson Smith notes in Combating Terrorism, „the solitary meeting 
was not as unremarkable as it may appear however, as several important and lasting 
decisions were achieved at the gathering.‟287 Particularly significant was the introduction of 
an affiliated interagency Working Group headed by Ambassador Armin Meyer. This 
Working Group was established to „coordinate intelligence data regarding terrorist 
organisations and their activities and to improve exchanges of such information with other 
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governments‟.288 The Working Group would regularly interact with the intelligence and 
enforcement agencies of the Executive Branch; the FBI, CIA, INS, NSA, Customs, Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Secret Service and Treasury.  It would conduct reviews 
relating to intelligence flow from international sources to domestic agencies as well as to 
local police jurisdictions and the various mechanisms utilised in the exchange of pertinent 
information.289  
 
The Working Group also had a significant long term influence as it created a number of 
fundamental guidelines for dealing with terrorist acts which Davidson Smith has claimed 
were „followed by every US administration since 1972.‟290 The „no concessions‟ policy that 
has become enshrined in the modern American counterterrorism doctrine291 was a policy 
that first emerged from the Working Group. Up until the early 1970s, American 
governments had dealt with hostage crises through negotiation with the terrorist elements. 
The American government had negotiated the release of the hostages in the case of the 
hijacked TWA flight in 1969 and had granted concessions to the PFLP in order to ensure the 
safe release of hostages at the Dawson Field crisis in September 1970.292 When the Black 
September Organisation detained ten hostages, including two US Ambassadors, at the Saudi 
Embassy in Khartoum in 1973, Nixon‟s declaration that „we will do everything we can to get 
them released but we will not pay black mail‟293 exemplifies his administration‟s new policy. 
The prevailing opinion has been that Nixon‟s comment was impulsive and, as Naftali 
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suggests, a result of the president „blowing off steam.‟294 Armin Meyer, however, has since 
claimed that the Working Group, at the urging of Kissinger had developed and advocated a 
„no negotiations, no deals and no concessions‟ policy some time before the incident in 
Khartoum.295 The Working group was also responsible for the introduction of the principle 
that host governments had responsibility for anti-terrorist protection measures and also that 
terrorist actions should be dealt with as criminal matters and terrorists prosecuted as 
criminal.296 It provided a forum for the discussion of counterterrorism issues and a point of 
reference for a number of subsequent presidents.297 Nixon had created a new paradigm in 
the United States‟ response to terrorism. 
 
Beyond its political ramifications, the Cabinet Committee and the affiliated interagency 
action group also constituted a clear shift in the Nixon administration‟s conceptualisation of 
terrorism. 298 With the introduction of a permanent executive arm to systematically deal with 
terrorist activity, the Nixon administration had effectively redefined the threat posed by 
international terrorism. Terrorism had transformed from an inconvenience to be dealt with 
via reactive policing to a fundamental challenge for national and international security. 
When Nixon resigned the presidency in 1974, Gerald Ford continued Nixon‟s efforts to form 
an international coalition against terrorism but did not think that the terrorist threat 
necessitated measures beyond those enacted by Nixon in response to the surge in hijackings 
between 1968 and 1972. In 1977 President Carter dismantled the Cabinet Committee to 
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Combat Terrorism only to replace it with a different executive counterterrorism organisation 
which performed similar fundamental functions and operated under the same rationale.299 
 
The Nixon administration was a counterterrorism pioneer. It was the first government of the 
United States to conceive of terrorism as a national issue. Throughout Nixon‟s presidency, 
the United States counterterrorism procedures evolved from the endorsement of the 
international community‟s efforts in the deterrence of international hijacking to the 
establishment of a permanent executive branch with the express purpose of enabling 
comprehensive and effective cooperative procedures and information sharing in countering 
terrorist threats.300 The Munich Massacre was a key factor in this evolution. It was a tragic 
demonstration that terrorism posed a serious threat to national and international security. 
Institutional measures needed to be established to meet this new challenge. The „Cabinet 
Committee to Combat Terrorism‟ and the affiliated Working Groups became the antecedents 
to the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism which is active 
today.301 An institutional legacy was created. As the international community continues to 
be plagued by terrorist incidents comparable to that which occurred at the 1972 Olympic 
Games, fundamental aspects of Nixon‟s counterterrorism measures continue to be relevant 
today.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis opened with Maximilien Robespierre‟s pronouncement in 1793 to „subdue by 
terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic.‟ This 
revolutionary ethos, espoused by Robespierre and almost 200 years later by members of the 
Black September Organisation manifested in a form of terrorism, embodied by the Munich 
Massacre, that the international community would not condone. The Munich Massacre 
changed the way the international community conceptualised terrorism and unleashed a 
counterterrorism force against terrorist actions like those committed by the Black September 
Organisation in Munich. This was not an organic development however. It was a corollary 
to the Nixon administration‟s response to the incident, a response determined by the 
negotiation of the intersection of multiple volatile state relations and domestic 
considerations. By reading the Munich Massacre back into the history of the Nixon 
administration‟s foreign policy, this thesis has uncovered those steps which caused both 
Nixon and the world to see international terrorist acts like the Munich Massacre as a menace 
to international society rather than as part of a revolutionary fight.  
 
Geopolitical considerations in the Middle-East were integral to the Nixon administration‟s 
response to the Munich Massacre. The United States had significant interests in supporting 
Israel in order to maintain a balance of power with the Soviet Union in the Middle-East. The 
Soviet Union formed the crux of their foreign policy objectives and was also the shadow 
behind their response to the Munich Massacre. The Nixon administration‟s immediate 
concerns were that Israel would enact harsh reprisals against the Arab world. Vengeance 
from the Israelis had the potential to upset the intricate foreign policy platform that Nixon 
and Kissinger had constructed around détente with the Soviet Union and furthermore, had 
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the potential to draw the superpowers into a proxy war in the Middle-East. Israel would 
have to be contained. 
  
The Nixon administration‟s resolve to contain Israel was made more complicated by 
various domestic considerations, however. Nixon and Kissinger, first and foremost 
world statesman, were ostensibly impervious to the pressures of domestic in the 
formation of foreign policy but the Munich Massacre was a provocative incident which 
triggered unrest in powerful sectors of American society. In the midst of a presidential 
election campaign, Nixon was especially sensitive to the pressures of interests groups. 
The vocal and powerful pro-Israeli groups were particularly forthright in the wake of 
the attack and Nixon came under increasing pressure to support Israel. Nixon and 
Kissinger‟s answer to this problem was to design measures that would show support for 
Israel, while distancing the United States from any direct intervention on involvement. 
 
The Munich Massacre was not an isolated act of terrorism however. It was the most visible 
instance of a new but increasingly prevalent phenomenon of international attacks. Since the 
late 1960s, national and transnational offences had proliferated under a revolutionary 
banner and caused mounting concern within the world community. Thus, in concert with 
their efforts to maintain geopolitical interests, the Nixon administration took the issue of 
international terrorism to the United Nations. Championing the lofty proposition that 
the world should „unite in opposition to terror‟,302 Nixon had recognised that by 
appealing to the United Nations to, the administration could effectively show their 
support for Israel without risking national interests. It was the pragmatic politics for 
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which Nixon and Kissinger were renowned.  
 
Showing pro-Israeli forces that the administration was serious about fighting the menace of 
international terrorism was also one of the key considerations in the formation of the 
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. This was an historic institution. The establishment 
of a permanent executive branch to systematically deal with terrorism was unprecedented in 
American history. For Nixon, the Cabinet Committee and its affiliated working groups were 
not purely about appeasing Israel however. In the Munich Massacre, a sacred symbol of 
international unity and reconciliation had been violated. This action caused fear and anger 
to breed throughout the world. Nixon recognised that terrorist actions like the Munich 
Massacre posed a serious threat to national and international security and necessitated an 
institutional response. 
 
The meeting of these two major concerns, containing Israel and dealing with the threat of 
increasing incidents of international terrorism, prompted the Nixon administration to 
implement a paradigmatic response to terrorism. It is a legacy that has awarded him 
surprisingly little acknowledgement however. The world has not moved on from dealing 
with acts of terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors and furthermore, the counterterrorism 
institutions that exist today have been modelled on the measures implemented by Nixon in 
the wake of the Munich Massacre. The Nixon administration‟s response to the attack 
appears to be as relevant today as it was in 1972 and deserving of a new and comprehensive 
history. 
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